India must prove Pakistan’s guilt in the attack in Kashmir
After terrorists brutally killed 26 men in Jammu & Kashmir on April 22nd, Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, did not mince his words. Breaking into English—a rarity—he warned: “India will identify, track and punish every terrorist and their backers.” The attack was the worst strike against tourists in Kashmir since an insurgency started in 1989 against Indian rule over the territory, which is claimed by both India and Pakistan. It was the deadliest in Muslim-majority region since a suicide bomb targeted paramilitary forces in 2019. This time the terrorists ensured that almost all their victims were Hindu by forcing them to give their names, and seeing if they could recite Islamic verses, before killing them.
On April 27th the Indian Navy responded with long-range missile drills. India has expelled several Pakistani diplomats and suspended the Indus Water Treaty, signed in 1960 between the two countries. India and Pakistan have exchanged fire over several nights. Further confrontation looks likely.
Mr Modi has every right to retaliate against militant extremists for the killing of Indian citizens, but he needs to keep India’s broad interests in mind. His aim should be to bring justice and to restore deterrence, but not to escalate the decades-long animosity between two nuclear powers into a fight that would threaten the region and the world.
The first requirement for retaliation is evidence. Local police are searching for two Pakistani men and one Indian man. The Resistance Front (TRF), the group which initially claimed the attack on social media only to deny responsibility later, alleging that it was hacked, was founded in 2019 after Mr Modi’s government revoked Jammu & Kashmir’s semi-autonomous status. TRF was declared a terrorist group by Mr Modi’s government in 2023.
Mr Modi’s government alleges cross-border involvement from Pakistan. Some in India’s intelligence circles claim that TRF is a front for Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Pakistan-based armed group behind the attacks in Mumbai in 2008, in which nearly 170 people were killed. LeT does indeed have long and well-established ties to Pakistan’s intelligence services, but India has yet to provide public proof of its link to TRF.
The second requirement is for any retaliation to advance India’s aims. After similar attacks in 2019 and 2016, India conducted air strikes or sent ground troops into Pakistan-administrated Kashmir. Mr Modi vowed to bring peace to Kashmir by taking direct control in 2019. He may not just feel bound to acknowledge calls for revenge, but as a strongman leader he may also see a chance to confront Pakistan.
However, even if India intends a military confrontation to be limited, it could escalate. Pakistan has already shot down an Indian drone. Its defence minister has warned of an imminent military strike by India. In 2019 an Indian jet was shot down in Pakistani territory. On that occasion Pakistan returned the pilot unharmed a few days later. This time the government in Pakistan may be less accommodating. General Asim Munir, Pakistan’s army chief, could exploit a tit-for-tat response as a way to distract from his problems at home. Once an escalation has started it would be hard to stop.
Until India has established who was behind the attack, it should therefore exercise restraint. Targeted strikes on militants would be justified, but broader attacks on Pakistani military bases, without clear evidence of the army’s complicity, may not be. India also has more options that stop short of war. It should publish evidence about the perpetrators to shame Pakistan and it could, for example, try to disrupt the $7bn bail-out promised to Pakistan last year by the IMF. Its suspension of the water treaty is less drastic than it sounds; it is not about to divert lots of water. Still, it sends a message that Pakistan would benefit from more constructive relations with its neighbour.
Whatever he does, Mr Modi should be thinking about the long term. For India, Pakistan is a distraction, as it assumes a more expansive role as the leading power in South Asia. A regional war would frustrate its plans to profit from the trade dispute between America and China. Indeed, the attacks may have been timed to coincide with the visit to India of J.D. Vance, America’s vice-president. Rather than risking a fight today, India would do better to continue modernising its armed forces. That may not only deter Pakistan, but also advance its interests against China. In the long run India’s real regional rival is not in Islamabad, but Beijing. ■