Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping meet and resolve a border row
A fatal border clash between India and China in 2020 did not just open a four-year fissure in bilateral ties: it triggered a tectonic shift in Asia’s geopolitics. In its aftermath, the two countries each sent tens of thousands of troops to their disputed Himalayan frontier, backed by artillery, missiles and fighter jets. China expanded military aid to Pakistan, India’s rival to the west. India, meanwhile, restricted Chinese investment and deepened defence ties with America and its allies. They, in turn, came to see India as a key partner in containing China.
A détente which could shake up regional geopolitics again is now under way. On October 21st Indian authorities said they had reached an agreement with China on patrolling rights that resolved the border standoff. The next day, China’s foreign ministry confirmed that a deal had been reached. Then, on October 23rd, India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, met China’s president, Xi Jinping, on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Russia. It was their first official bilateral meeting since 2019.
Details of the border deal have yet to be made public. Much will depend on how it is implemented in the coming weeks. Even so, the diplomatic breakthrough heralds a new phase of bilateral ties that prioritises economic co-operation. That is partly because Mr Xi, concerned by a slowing Chinese economy and trade barriers abroad, wants better access to India’s market. But Mr Modi also needs more Chinese technology, investment and expertise to achieve his manufacturing goals and repair the damage from a surprise setback in this year’s general election. Despite the border crisis, China edged past America to reclaim its position as India’s top trading partner in the 2023-24 financial year.
The timing is opportune for the Indian and Chinese leaders as well, coming just a fortnight before America’s presidential election. For Mr Xi, it signals to the next American president that efforts to isolate China economically, and to build a coalition of like-minded democracies, are not working. And though Mr Modi is likely to deepen ties with America whoever wins the White House, a simultaneous rapprochement with China underlines India’s commitment to a “multi-aligned” foreign policy that encompasses close ties with Russia too. Mr Modi made this clear when he met Vladimir Putin on October 22nd.
It is also a useful hedge for Mr Modi. If Kamala Harris wins, it could help offset American pressure on India over issues including human rights, exports of restricted technology to Russia and Indian officials’ alleged involvement in an assassination attempt on a Sikh activist in America. If Donald Trump prevails, it might mitigate the impact of potential trade tariffs on India or an American pivot towards China.
The border agreement between India and China does not resolve their underlying dispute, which stems from the blurry boundaries sketched by the British when they ruled the Indian subcontinent. China still claims the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. India claims Aksai Chin, an area controlled by China (see map). But the deal could help avert the kind of military encounters that grew more frequent and violent as each side piled up frontier infrastructure in the years preceding the clash in 2020. That skirmish, in which 20 Indian soldiers and at least four Chinese ones died, was the first fatal one on the border in more than four decades.
The two sides’ military commanders and civilian officials have since held regular talks to avoid further violence. By September 2022, they had reduced tensions by establishing “buffer zones”, within which neither side patrols, at five of seven major flashpoints. But over the past two years they have struggled to find a solution at the last two flashpoints, Demchok and Depsang Plains, which both consider to be more strategically significant.
Easing off
Indian officials suggest the new agreement will allow India and China to patrol as they did before, rather than extending the buffer zones to the two remaining areas. “We have gone back to where the situation was in 2020,” India’s foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, told a conference on October 21st. He added that the “disengagement process with China” was complete, suggesting that troops who had been blocking each other’s patrols in Demchok and Depsang were no longer doing so.
General Upendra Dwivedi, India’s army chief, was more cautious. He said the goal was to “restore trust”, including by checking that neither side was creeping into the buffer zones. India would then look at “disengagement, de-escalation and normal management” of the border. The Chinese foreign ministry spokesman who confirmed the deal did not provide more details, adding only that China would work with India to implement the agreement.
Some Indian media reports said that the two sides had each agreed to patrol twice a month at different times, according to an agreed schedule and with a maximum of 15 troops per patrol. Previously, there was no agreed schedule or size for patrols. Other reports suggested that the agreement would apply only to Demchok and Depsang, while buffer zones would remain in place at the other flashpoints.
Deependra Singh Hooda, a former chief of the Indian Army’s Northern Command, which oversees part of the Chinese border, suspects that the latter is true. He thinks that India would have insisted on patrolling at Depsang in particular because the area, which is largely flat, is too big to monitor remotely and too important as a conduit for a large-scale offensive. “My own sense is we’re not getting back exactly to the status quo pre-2020,” he says. “But I think this is the closest we can get to it.”
Neither side is likely to withdraw all the firepower they recently moved to the wider border area. Nor will they stop modernising their armed forces to prepare for future clashes. For India, that means sticking to a path of closer military ties with Western partners. China and India will also still compete for influence in South Asia. And a fresh border flare-up could easily trigger another crisis.
The big question now is whether diplomatic reconciliation could turn into a prolonged period of economic integration between Asia’s giants. If that were to occur, it would indeed be a landmark of Himalayan significance. ■
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