Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief.
The highlights this week: Xi and Trump have an unexpected phone call, China escalates its dispute with Japan, and Chinese scientists make a nuclear energy breakthrough.
Trump and Xi Have Surprise Phone Call
Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump had an unexpected phone call on Monday, reaffirming, according to the Chinese readout, a successful meeting in Busan, South Korea, last month. In his Truth Social post, Trump said that the two talked mostly about trade and agreed to reciprocal visits, with him going to Beijing in April and Xi visiting Washington later next year.
But what’s most interesting here is the treatment of Taiwan. China didn’t mention it in the readout of the Busan meeting, and Trump said it wasn’t discussed. This time, however, the Chinese side said Xi restated China’s “principled position” on Taiwan and emphasized that Taiwan’s “return to China is an integral part of the post-war international order.”
It seems unlikely that the two leaders actually had meaningful discussions about Taiwan this time around. When Chinese and U.S. leaders talk about Taiwan, they are often speaking past each other, and the phrases Xi used are loaded with implications that Trump may not have fully understood.
Within Chinese media and political circles, only a very narrow set of terms can be used to address Taiwan—and straying from these carries big consequences. When Chinese diplomats succeed in getting U.S. officials to use these terms, they often present it as a victory. But often the Americans are just mirroring the language used by their counterparts, without ascribing any significance to it. Plus, the Chinese don’t always realize that those officials might use entirely different terms in another context, such as when talking to the Taiwanese.
The same phrases can also mean very different things to each side. The most prominent example is “One China,” of which Washington and Beijing have vastly divergent interpretations. Another long-standing one is “the post-war international order.” In Beijing’s lexicon, this order—which must be “respected” or viewed with a “correct historical perspective”—essentially implies that China and Russia are great powers entitled to act freely within their respective spheres of influence.
That rhetoric became transparent, for instance, when Xi repeatedly used the phrase in an article written for Russian media—the unsubtle implication being that Taiwan belongs to China and Ukraine to Russia.
It’s ironic that Beijing leans on the phrase so heavily, given that the immediate postwar international order—and all the wartime negotiations that shaped it—awarded China’s seat on the U.N. Security Council to the Republic of China, not the People’s Republic.
But to Americans, the phrase sounds like a generic historical statement, not an assertion of China’s place in the world. In normal times, China specialists within the U.S. government understood how Beijing uses such language and—at least in theory—briefed the president on these nuances before speaking with foreign leaders. That may no longer be the case.
Rather, Trump has a habit of echoing the last impressive person he spoke with, even if he has previously criticized that person, whether that’s Xi or New York City Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani. This tendency may leave Xi with the impression that he has impacted U.S. policy far more than is actually the case.
But Monday’s call may have conveyed at least one message to Trump. One major reason it happened now is that, as I noted last week, China is still embroiled in a tense dispute with Japan following new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks suggesting that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan might justify Japanese military intervention.
On Sunday, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said Takaichi’s remarks were “shocking” and had “crossed a red line.” The problem with that phrase, however, is that China applies it to everything from routine human rights criticism to major diplomatic quarrels, diluting its impact.
As a loser of World War II, Japan is a particular target of China’s “post-war international order” assertions. When Xi spoke with Trump, he was likely either trying to get Trump to put pressure on Japan or looking for agreement from Trump that Japan’s behavior is unacceptable.
Trump appears to have understood the assignment—he called Takaichi and discussed China shortly after speaking with Xi, although Takaichi’s account of the call made no mention of Taiwan. Reading between the lines, I would guess Trump brought up the Chinese position and Takaichi managed to deflect him successfully.
This is a delicate situation: If Xi thinks Trump has agreed to pressure Tokyo and nothing comes of it, the dispute with Japan could escalate further, potentially undermining the recent U.S.-China rapprochement. Trump’s admiration for Takaichi, a hard-right nationalist, doesn’t make matters any easier.
At the same time, Beijing may be satisfied simply with Trump calling Xi a “great leader” and the prospect of future meetings. And if the White House remains silent on the China-Japan rift, rather than backing its ally, that’s still a win for Beijing.
What We’re Following
Japanese missiles. Beijing escalated its feud with Japan on Monday when it criticized Tokyo’s plan to deploy surface-to-air missiles to a military base on Yonaguni, a Japanese island near Taiwan. (Thanks to its annexing the Ryukyu Islands in 1879 and being allowed to keep them after World War II, Japanese territory still extends surprisingly far.) This is not a new plan: It’s likely that China is just casting about for anything it can use as leverage.
Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi, who visited Yonaguni over the weekend, finds himself in a tricky position. Though he lost the race for prime minister to Takaichi, he shares her nationalistic politics and secured a cabinet post in the post-election factional negotiations.
Given domestic political needs, it’s unlikely that Tokyo will back down on this issue, but that may cause Beijing to double down. And as a long-running quarrel with South Korea shows, China is sensitive to missile-related deployments, even defensive ones.
Taiwan invasion plans. An excellent investigation published by Reuters last Thursday shows how the Chinese navy is enlisting civilian vessels to prepare for an invasion of Taiwan. Amphibious assaults are extremely difficult, and any such operation faces the notorious challenge of the “million-man swim,” which entails getting a large invasion force across the strait that separates Taiwan from the mainland.
Using civilian vessels is a logical solution for this problem. China also has a history of employing ostensibly civilian vessels as a “shadow fleet” for maritime harassment, especially in the South China Sea. That said, this does not signal imminent action; China has been conducting Taiwan invasion drills for decades.
FP’s Most Read This Week
- What to Know About the Secret U.S.-Russia Peace Plan for Ukraine by Sam Skove and John Haltiwanger
- The Deathonomics of Putin’s War by Alexey Kovalev
- Has China’s Power Peaked in Asia? by Bilahari Kausikan
Tech and Business
Nuclear energy leap. China has made a significant breakthrough in the use of thorium, a slightly radioactive metal, to make nuclear fuel. Earlier this month, it was announced that an experimental reactor located in the Gobi Desert had successfully converted thorium to uranium.
Several steps remain before thorium can be used for civilian energy, and it is not considered suitable for nuclear weapons. Still, given China’s substantial thorium deposits and potential reserves, this technological advance could help the country circumvent the constraints of its relatively limited uranium supply.
Real estate stimulus package. Despite the country’s technological prowess, the Chinese economy is still reliant on its long-deflating real estate market—and the government knows it. Urban middle-class wealth is overwhelmingly tied up in property, yet sales are plunging and prices are slumping this year, despite repeated efforts to prop up the sector.
The government is preparing yet another stimulus package in an effort to finally stabilize the market, which has been in crisis since 2020, but there is little indication that it will succeed. Beijing can wield financial power that many democratic governments cannot, but that can sometimes prolong crises rather than resolve them. In this case, efforts to prevent a public shock from crashing property prices have contributed to a near-permanent stagnation in sales.