Japan’s newly installed prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, has quickly waded into her first foreign-policy quagmire. Japan’s relationship with China is at a new low following her comments over what Tokyo might do in the event of an attack on Taiwan by Beijing.
The saga began on Nov. 7, when Takaichi—a foreign-policy hawk—spoke of a number of potential scenarios for a Chinese attack on Taiwan and the possible role that Japan could take to help U.S. forces under the U.S.-Japan defense treaty, saying at one point that “no matter how you think about it, it could constitute a survival-threatening situation.”
Such a determination would be enough to deploy Japan’s Self Defense Forces (SDF), a technically nonmilitary force that in practice is often ranked by analysts as one of the 10 most powerful in the world, but is constrained under the post-World War II Japanese Constitution. The SDF is the middle of a large-scale upgrade through an ongoing increase in the defense budget.
“Whatever kind of situation occurs, [Japan’s response] would require a comprehensive decision based on the information available,” Takaichi said.
The remarks are in line with Japan’s policies and echo comments by Takaichi’s mentor, the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and former Prime Minister Taro Aso, who is a power behind the scenes in the current administration. Abe said in 2021 that “[a] Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency, and therefore an emergency for the Japan-U.S. alliance. People in Beijing, President Xi Jinping in particular, should never have a misunderstanding in recognizing this.”
Aso, known for speaking plainly, said the same year that “[i]f a major problem took place in Taiwan, it would not be too much to say that it could relate to a survival-threatening situation” for Japan.
But optics are, of course, important. Abe made his comment after stepping down from office, while Aso, who was deputy prime minister at the time, was speaking to local supporters in his constituency. Takaichi, on the other hand, made her statements as the leader of the country and while speaking in a formal session of the parliament.
China’s response has been fast and furious. After making initial statements over “hurting the feelings of the Chinese people,” there was a high-profile summoning of Japan’s ambassador in Beijing. Meanwhile, Xue Jian—the Chinese consul general in Osaka—decided that he would weigh in with the rather provocative statement on social media that it would be suitable to “cut a dirty neck without a moment of hesitation.” This moment of bravado, harking back to the “wolf warrior” days of Chinese diplomacy, was apparently too much for the bosses back home, and the post has since been removed.
It was a chance for China to test a leader—and Japan’s first female prime minister, elected only on Oct. 21 after becoming head of the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Her position is far from unassailable, since she relies on support from the regional Japan Innovation Party as a coalition partner—an alliance that still leaves the government with less than a full majority in parliament.
Japan has tried to cool things down, with the chief government spokesman stressing that Takaichi’s remarks did not signal a change in Japanese policy while the Foreign Ministry’s director-general for Asian and Oceanian affairs met with his Chinese counterpart.
But Tokyo may have suffered from a lack of expertise. The China whisperers in Japan’s political leadership have been largely pushed aside. Most notable is the absence of senior figures from the Komeito party, who have been seen as more pro-Chinese and had been in the ruling alliance with the Liberal Democratic Party for a total of 23 years until Takaichi took over.
None of the efforts to calm things down have worked so far. In a further escalation, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi issued a strongly worded statement through official media on Nov. 23, two weeks into the crisis. State news agency Xinhua reported that Wang felt that “it is shocking for a sitting Japanese leader to openly send a wrong signal of attempting to intervene militarily in the Taiwan question.” The agency went on to say that this is “a red line that should not have been touched.”
China also said it was taking the issue to the United Nations, alleging that the Takaichi remarks were a threat of “armed intervention” that would be an “act of aggression” against China.
Actions have followed words. China has renewed its ban on Japanese seafood imports, which had been recently largely lifted at the end of a two-year restriction that began in 2023, although products from key fishing areas around the Fukushima nuclear power plant have been banned ever since the nuclear power accident there in 2011. Beijing has also issued an “advisory” to stop Chinese tourists from visiting Japan. This has resulted in around 500,000 canceled trips, according to a Beijing-based aviation analyst.
The impact of this is far from earth-shattering for Japan’s economy. Tourism is a serious issue, but the industry is already overstretched due to high demand, especially since a shrinking Japanese workforce means there are not enough people to work in the food and beverage industry. The problems can be seen in high-tourist areas such as Tokyo’s Ginza district, where restaurants have cut hours and seating due to a lack of staff. Tourists from China and Hong Kong totaled 925,000 in September, making them the largest single group. But Taiwan, with a much smaller population, accounted for 527,000 tourists that month, according to the figures—and those numbers may grow.
There is also a potential political benefit for Takaichi, who campaigned on tightening rules around foreigners coming into Japan. While the focus is on immigration, hordes of Chinese tourists in central Tokyo and Kyoto have been an unwelcome poster-child case for the problems of letting in too many foreigners, blamed by many Japanese for their supposed lack of manners.
Other economic actions could well follow, with some Chinese analysts pushing for a ban on rare-earth exports. But this is clearly a double-edged sword. Japan imports rare earths to make high-tech components that are then exported to China to create goods for end users. If China stops the rare earths, then Japan stops the microchips and camera lenses that go into iPhones. This is hardly a viable strategy, especially when China’s own economy is far from robust. As U.S. President Donald Trump has learned, supply chains are complex animals, especially within the highly interdependent economies of Asia.
Takaichi has repeatedly refused to back down, and her defense minister announced on Nov. 23 that Japan would go ahead with plans for Japan basing medium-range surface-to-air missiles on an outlying Japanese island just 110 kilometers (about 70 miles) away from Taiwan, sparking another diplomatic broadside from Beijing.
“The deployment can help lower the chance of an armed attack on our country,” Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi told reporters on a visit to the base.
This seems to sit well with the Japanese people—after all, who likes to be bullied? Takaichi’s support rate has jumped 5 points from when she took office to near a commanding 70 percent, according to a survey by the national news agency Kyodo.
“My sense is that the Taiwan discourse in Japan has become more prominent. Politicians, including prime ministers, have become less restrained in talking about a potential Japan role in a Taiwan contingency, and this has been the case for a few years now, especially since the Ukraine invasion,” said Corey Wallace, an assistant professor at Kanagawa University, Yokohama, who specializes in Japanese foreign policy and East Asian military issues.
One perpetual reality in China-Japan relations is that China gets to set the state of play. Take the last big quarrel in 2012, sparked by Japan’s nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands—some largely meaningless rock outcrops that it controls and Beijing claims, and which were previously in private hands. The then-governor of Tokyo—far-right politician Shintaro Ishihara—threatened to buy the islands from a private owner, and the Japanese central government sought to forestall him.
Japanese authorities, surprised by the vehemence of China’s reaction to what Japanese leaders saw as a measure to prevent Ishihara’s provocation, could do little more than wait out the situation, which took years to improve. This could well have parallels today.
“It depends on what China would like to do, because we don’t have too much control. It is almost impossible for the prime minister to say ‘I misspoke,’ so we will stick to our position,” said Narushige Michishita, a professor at Japan’s National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. “China would like to undermine Ms. Takaichi’s position, but I’m not sure to what extent China wants to undermine the broader China-Japan relationship,” he added.
As long as the economic fallout remains limited, neither side will see any benefit from compromising. This is potentially good news for the United States, which wants Japan to take a harder line on China. Takaichi, who styles herself after former U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, seems more than willing to put beefed-up regional security ahead of a smooth relationship with Beijing. No wonder she and Trump get along.