America’s presidential election marks a fork in the road for Ukraine

Volodymyr Zelensky, the president of Ukraine, visited America in September to speak at the United Nations and present a “victory plan” to his American patrons. The trip did not go well. Mr Zelensky criticised Donald Trump and enraged Republicans by appearing alongside Democrats at a munitions factory. And Biden administration officials were underwhelmed by his proposal to end the war.

Mr Zelensky did hold seemingly positive meetings with both Kamala Harris and Mr Trump. The outcome of their race is likely to have a big impact on Ukraine’s future. Talk of an endgame is gathering, including thorny questions about whether America’s next president might be willing to invite Ukraine to join NATO. Yet neither candidate has offered clarity about strategy or presented a credible plan to change the dynamic on the ground.

That dynamic is grim. As Ukraine slogs to the end of its third year of war, its army has made virtually no progress since retaking the capital of the Kherson region in 2022. Russia has been making slow, grinding gains, at high cost. More than half a million Russians have been killed or wounded, America estimates.

The prospects for peace seem remote. Mr Zelensky insists that his goal remains re-establishing Ukraine’s 1991 borders—including Crimea, which has been in Russian hands for more than a decade. Vladimir Putin’s strategy is to wait out the West, and he has shown no interest in ending the war on anything other than his terms. Yet neither the Russians nor the Ukrainians have demonstrated the military strength to achieve the outcomes they seek.

Ms Harris has mostly echoed Joe Biden’s rhetoric on Ukraine, saying she will stand with the country and seek continued military aid. She has said little about whether or how she might depart from Mr Biden’s policy, which has been tempered by his fear of an escalating conflict between NATO and Russia. Mr Trump has been inconsistent but also vague—promising to end the war immediately and urging both Russia and Ukraine to come to the negotiating table.

Tough choices will be unavoidable after the next president takes office. America has provided Ukraine with about $174bn in support, most recently through a $61bn assistance bill in April. The Pentagon can stretch aid packages, and Mr Biden may cajole Congress to pass more legislation between the election and his successor’s inauguration. But the next president will have to decide whether to provide more aid—and what caveats to attach to it.

Republicans, particularly in the House of Representatives, where they are in the majority, have become notably cooler towards Ukraine. If Democrats win back the House and the presidency, aid to Ukraine is likely to keep flowing, even if control of the Senate shifts to Republicans, as is probable, according to The Economist’s forecast model. Full Republican control in Washington would prove more difficult for Mr Zelensky. If Mr Trump is elected, another uncertainty is whether he will empower internationalists like Mike Pompeo, the former CIA director and secretary of state, or ideological isolationists like J.D. Vance, his vice-presidential running-mate.

No one in Mr Biden’s White House believes that Ukraine could retake Crimea by military means. That implies that some endgame negotiation with Russia would be required, eventually. Mr Trump’s promise to end the war quickly is implausible. Yet there is wide recognition that talks may be necessary sooner rather than later and that Ukraine’s beleaguered population may be open to certain trade-offs. Polling shows that more than half of the country would accept losing the Donbas and Crimea in exchange for regaining sovereignty over the occupied parts of Zaporizhia and Kherson. Some 38% of Ukrainians say they would be willing to accept current territorial boundaries if the country was admitted into the European Union and received funding to rebuild. That figure rises to 47% if Ukraine is welcomed into NATO—which is perhaps the most sensitive question for the next president.

In a joint statement, NATO’s 32 members said in July that Ukraine was on an “irreversible” path to joining the alliance. So far Mr Biden has been sceptical of offering a formal invitation of membership, which Kyiv desperately seeks. Doing so would come with a host of problems, given that the country is at war. But creative thinking on how to use the possibility of NATO membership as leverage against Mr Putin and as backing for Ukraine’s recovery could help stabilise the conflict and perhaps end or reduce its intense violence.

The reality is that Mr Zelensky and his allies in Europe and Washington have yet to articulate a realistic plan for how to win the war. Mr Putin’s Russia, on the other hand, is weaker than Ukraine and the West together, but hopes to outlast his enemies. Mr Zelensky remains a stalwart figure of Ukrainian resilience, but his popularity at home is ebbing. He can only hope that the next American president is devoted to developing a plausible vision of success. ■

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