An Israel-Hizbullah war would be a disaster for both
Since Hizbullah started firing missiles at Israel on October 8th last year, Israelis, Lebanese and outsiders have dreaded escalation. Now it seems to be happening. The simmering conflict between Israel and Hizbullah, the Shia militia in Lebanon, is boiling over. More than 500 people were killed in a single day of air strikes as Israel targeted Hizbullah’s commanders and weapons. Tens of thousands of Lebanese have fled from the south. And Hizbullah is hitting back. On September 25th Israel intercepted a ballistic missile heading for Tel Aviv, the first time the militia has targeted Israel’s commercial capital.
As bad as things seem, they could get a lot worse. Israel has more troops in the north than it has had for the past nine months—though a ground invasion would demand still larger numbers, positioned in staging-areas on the border. Fears are growing that both sides are trapped on a path towards a terrifying conflagration. Yet both sides still have time, and good reason, to step back.
Both know that all-out war would be bloody and ruinous, and ultimately lead only to a return of the armed stand-off that prevailed before October 7th. Many would needlessly die, on both sides. Israel claims to have destroyed as much as 50% of Hizbullah’s arsenal, but it had more than 120,000 rockets and missiles. What is left could still do grave harm. Israel’s military muscle would not guarantee victory, as past wars in Lebanon have shown. A ground invasion would pit Israel’s troops, battle-weary after months of combat in Gaza, against a well-armed and hardened enemy on its own turf. A second big war would batter Israel’s economy. And Israeli attacks on infrastructure would aggravate Lebanon’s already dire economic collapse. Due to atrocious governance, its gdp is less than half what it was in 2019.
Even Iran, Hizbullah’s sponsor, seems wary of escalation. Masoud Pezeshkian, its new president, said at the un this week that it would not allow Israel to goad it into a regional conflict. The leaders of the Islamic Republic may well prefer their most powerful proxy to save its weapons as a deterrent against a direct Israeli attack on their own country.
Israel has further reasons to step back. It cannot destroy Hizbullah, only weaken it. It has inflicted huge damage on the militia since July. Once it has worked its way through Hizbullah’s medium-range rocket stockpiles and high command, it will soon run out of targets it can easily strike. If it goes after the group’s political leaders, including Hassan Nasrallah, or its long-range missiles, Hizbullah and Iran will at some point calculate that they must use its arsenal rather than lose it. That is a threshold Israel does not want to cross.
The best way out of the conflict lies to the south. Mr Nasrallah has said he will stop firing on Israel when there is a ceasefire in Gaza. Such an agreement could then allow Hizbullah to pull back along the lines set out by un Resolution 1701, passed in 2006, which requires the militia to withdraw north of the Litani river, 30km from the border.
Alas, a truce in Gaza still seems out of reach because of the intransigence of both Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, and Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas. A ceasefire between Israel and Hizbullah, as urged by America, much of Europe and several Arab nations, may be more achievable. Under pressure from Iran, Hizbullah might be persuaded to quietly step back; Israel may be satisfied that it has done enough for now. Even an informal truce would be a relief.
It would let Israelis return to their homes in the north and Lebanese to theirs in the south. Israel would still live under the shadow of a hostile and heavily armed opponent close to its border, so a truce today is no guarantee against conflict tomorrow. But one ceasefire would be better than none. ■