A mineral deal with America points to a path ahead for Ukraine
LATE ON APRIL 30th, Ukraine and America reached agreement on a minerals deal that has been months—and much pain—in the making. Last-minute setbacks and ultimatums nearly derailed the signing, echoing the chaotic genesis of negotiations. First proposed by the Ukrainians to President Joe Biden last autumn as a trade of mineral rights for more weapons, the deal soon became a test of unquestioning loyalty to Donald Trump. Drafts were presented by his officials in angry ultimatums, before vanishing. One agreement unravelled spectacularly following a now infamous falling-out between Mr Trump and his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, in the Oval office.
The memory of that day has arguably now been overshadowed by the set of three new agreements, concluded by Scott Bessent, America’s treasury secretary, and Yulia Svyrydenko, Ukraine’s deputy prime minister and economy minister. One document is an inter-governmental agreement that will require ratification by the Ukrainian parliament (hence sharing the political responsibility for what is a controversial document). The other two—commercial agreements that were the subject of last-minute wrangling—define the investment structure and its terms.
The war means it is not yet clear if any of the three will ever be implemented in full. Disputes continue over how many rare and critical minerals Ukraine can truly offer. But as a political gesture, the agreements are a rare triumph for Mr Trump, seeking achievements to show off, and for Ukraine, which is determined not to be sacrificed in a great-power reset.
The deal also marks a success for Ukrainian diplomacy, which has not always excelled in slow, patient negotiation. Led by the deputy economy minister Taras Kachka, the Ukrainian team secured important concessions over two exhausting rounds of talks. American demands for repayment of past military aid—delivered as grants—were dropped, as were mobster-like claims for $500bn and then $350bn worth of Ukrainian resources. Proposals for American control of the partnership and 100% of its profits were also abandoned. Instead, the investment fund will operate on equal terms: joint governance and shared future profits. Existing projects that support Ukraine’s current budget are excluded. The deal will apply only to future natural resource and infrastructure projects, selected by Ukraine. It is not clear whether these will include future oil and gas exploration.
For supporters of Ukraine inside the American administration, the deal offers a glimpse at a mechanism for continued military assistance, albeit one that remains unspecified and improbable. A source close to the White House said the deal would help to break a notion prevalent in MAGA circles that Ukraine is only a Democratic Party concern, as well as creating a new sense of “alignment” for Ukraine with Trumpland. A Ukrainian source with knowledge of the negotiations said the recent thaw in relations between Mr Trump and Mr Zelensky, seen most obviously in a 15-minute tête-à-tête in the Vatican, helped remove the most egregious American demands, and exempted the new investment vehicle from American tax.
The deal now most closely resembles a framework presented by America at the Munich Security Conference in February. That version, considered the mildest of three main American proposals, was abruptly withdrawn when President Zelensky declined to sign on the spot. Since then, the Americans have applied huge pressure including, on occasion, blackmail tactics. A Ukrainian insider described the final documents as “huge progress” compared with drafts circulated earlier this month. “These are better terms than we expected,” the source said. “In the circumstances, you might even call them good agreements.”
Much will depend on how Mr Trump now uses the agreement in negotiations with Vladimir Putin. Many insiders believe his mind is yet to be made up on Ukraine, despite the strong isolationist and anti-Ukrainian leanings of the MAGA base and his political appointees. After signing the deal, Mr Bessent said the new partnership “signals clearly to Russia that the Trump Administration is committed to...a free, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine over the long term”. Ukraine will be happy with that language, though well aware that the promise is lacking in specifics. The hope remains that the deal could, eventually, bring real security guarantees or weapons—and fulfil the aims of the original quid pro quo the Ukrainians offered America last autumn. ■