Trump’s armed forces won’t look like Biden’s

DONALD TRUMP, seeing “a big, beautiful Ocean” between his country and the world’s problems, wants to curtail America’s responsibilities abroad. His party is also broadly keen on increasing military spending, and the Trump administration, working with Congress, has new priorities for the Pentagon.

In February several media outlets reported that Pete Hegseth, the defence secretary, had ordered a $50bn cut to Pentagon spending. Yet the reported memorandum’s vague language and fuzzy maths belied the reality that Mr Hegseth was seeking cuts merely to offset new spending on “America First” programmes. The Pentagon chief vowed that the changes would make the American “military once again into the most lethal, badass force on the planet”.

Defence spending is poised to rise above levels in the Biden era, when the former president consistently requested after-inflation reductions to outlays. On February 21st the Senate approved $150bn in new defence spending, on top of the department’s existing annual budget that approaches $900bn. The following week a House bill approved $100bn. Some Hill appropriators wonder whether these big numbers will survive the give-and-take of complex spending negotiations, but it is clear that if Mr Trump is pulling back from the world, he isn’t yet pulling back on defence spending.

“He wants to restore peace through strength,” says Roger Wicker, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. He adds that Mr Trump has called for allies to spend 5% of GDP on defence. “There’s every reason to think that if he’s going to do that, he’s prepared for us to lead by example.” In 2024 America spent about 3% of GDP on defence.

Mr Hegseth has ordered the Pentagon to divert $50bn in “nonlethal programs” towards 17 MAGA priorities—from nuclear modernisation to border security. He has cited DEI and climate-change programmes as easy cuts. But for all of the Pentagon’s bloat it won’t be long before hard trade-offs come into play.

“The Trump administration will not be able to generate anywhere near $50bn in savings by cutting diversity and climate programmes alone,” says Seamus Daniels, a defence-budget expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank. He notes that the 2025 budget request included only $162m for dedicated diversity, equity, inclusion and accessibility activities. Climate programmes account for around $5bn. Elaine McCusker, a former Pentagon comptroller, estimates that Mr Hegseth could find $15bn in cuts from activities “not linked to warfighter capability”. That includes programmes like the $1.5bn per year that subsidise grocery stores for military families. But anything perceived as a cut to service members’ benefits would be hard politically.

To get to $50bn in savings, the remaining reductions would have to come from military spending as traditionally understood. Here policymakers will have to balance readiness, modernisation and the overall strength and size of the armed services. In other words, how big will the force be; how trained and ready is it to fight today; and how much is being invested into preparing for fighting in the future? On all these counts, the service most at risk is the army.

Consider the realities on the ground, argue several Trump-supporting defence wonks. A Western-backed Ukraine has tied down Vladimir Putin’s armed forces in Ukraine. Israel has weakened Iran across the Middle East. Kim Jong Un continues developing nuclear weapons, but conventional war on the Korean peninsula appears improbable in the near future. All the while, China grows more prepared to take Taiwan. America’s army, the thinking across much of Washington goes, primarily exists to deter or fight land wars, and so the Pentagon should shift resources away from Europe and towards the Pacific.

While the army has seen its readiness improved thanks to the war in Ukraine—soon 100,000 155mm shells will be produced monthly, up from fewer than 3,000 in the mid-2010s—work remains to be done on systems and munitions important to deterring China. That means building up the maritime industrial base and building many more unmanned systems. This is likely to benefit the navy and air force, at the expense of the army.

Republicans’ thin majorities, and recent political history, suggest that will be a tough sell on Capitol Hill. And some wonks in the Pentagon think the wrong debate has taken place. Rather than weakening the army, planners ought to think about how to play to the army’s strengths for a war with China. This unresolved debate will take months, if not years, to play out.

Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) also complicates arguments. Mr Musk is sceptical of manned fighter aircraft, yet there is a consensus on the Hill that next-generation air dominance ought to be a strategic priority. Will Mr Musk get into Mr Trump’s ear and upend delicate negotiations? Or will he help out by finding savings elsewhere?

The defence secretary’s memorandum also protects spending on nuclear modernisation, missile defence, shipbuilding, advanced cybersecurity, munitions and unmanned systems. An open question is how much money gets eaten up by border enforcement or Mr Trump’s Iron Dome for America, a proposed missile shield.

Hawks disspirited by Mr Trump’s apparent pivot towards Russia—a notable break from his relatively restrained first term—at least find this likely defence build-up comforting. “We are seeing consistency in priorities so far from the first term, with a faster, more aggressive start,” says Ms McCusker. “We will see some funding reallocations from areas without a strong link to military capability toward programmes aligned with the defence core mission.” Yet Mr Trump’s rhetoric risks devaluing his own investments in American deterrence. ■