The Dangerous Fallout of Trump’s Retreat to the Hemisphere

Last December, U.S. Rep. Andy Ogles summed up the “alpha ” mindset of U.S. foreign policy by declaring that the United States is “the dominant predator across all landscapes.”

Ogles’s choice of an ambiguous word like “landscapes” aligned with the fact that the United States has global reach, far-flung allies, massive influence, and the military might to dominate landscapes in any hemisphere. One word from the president, and a U.S. cruise missile can land on any square foot of any country. A nod of the head, and thousands of superbly equipped soldiers can be shipped and flown across any ocean.

As the world’s dominant superpower, the United States has a long history of projecting power globally. This has not always delivered the results that various U.S. administrations were looking for, but the ability to muster hundreds of thousands of troops, planes, tanks, and ships anywhere in the world is huge power—particularly when that power is delivered in concert with a loyal network of allies. Because of this truly global influence, the United States can perform operations in any hemisphere without encountering meaningful resistance from regional powers.

Washington hasn’t amassed all that power only for power’s sake. The United States has real global interests, including the stability of the dollar-based financial system, open seas for global navigation, access to strategic resources anywhere in the world, and the ability to use Europe and so many other regions for power projection. The list of interests has grown, as has the force required to secure them. It was all a carefully managed and delicate system of hard power, soft persuasion, and carefully nurtured institutions—realism and idealism all mixed together.

At first glance, U.S. President Donald Trump’s actions in Venezuela, combined with the recent National Security Strategy, could appear to be part of that classic narrative of U.S. power projection. In reality, however, they signal an abrupt and deliberate retreat from the position of global superpower.

In response to questions about the Venezuela raid last week, Ogles was reading from an updated script. He declared the United States to be “the dominant predator force in the Western Hemisphere.” Gone was the ambiguity of “landscapes” in undefined regions—the new plan is to focus U.S. “alpha” behavior on just one hemisphere. In effect, this is an unforced retreat from the many landscapes the United States has had an interest in for decades. Trump is simply adopting the same worldview based on spheres of influence long promoted by Russia and China.

Many commentators have focused on the dangers of the United States deliberately flouting and thus weakening international law, warning that Trump is setting precedents that dictators will exploit. They argue that Trump’s actions in Venezuela might give ideas to Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin—as if they were waiting for ideas and permission from the White House. Of course they aren’t waiting. Xi surely has his own plan and schedule for an attempt to take Taiwan. And after years of Russian war crimes in Ukraine, Putin doesn’t strike me as someone who asks for permission.

That is not to say Trump’s latest actions do not affect the calculations of the expansion-minded dictators running Russia and China. They will see his announcements as unforced acquiescence to the “multipolarity” narrative they have been pushing for decades—the idea of multiple centers of power, each dominating their own region. Trump’s new hemisphere strategy will be read as nothing more than submission to the vision long held by the United States’ enemies of breaking U.S. hegemony. They won’t cry about losing the Caribbean if their ambition to expand within their own region is legitimized. (That’s why in 2019, during Trump’s first term, Moscow offered to give Washington free hand in Venezuela in return for Russia having its way with Ukraine.)

With Trump’s endorsement of regional spheres of domination, Putin and Xi no longer need to obfuscate their aggressive imperial ambitions. They can celebrate them openly without fear of condemnation. They will treat Trump’s narrowing of U.S. priorities as a climbdown—in effect, a green light to move faster and with less caution. This will not increase security in either hemisphere.

As when the United States dominated the world from 1945 to 2025, Britain once had to ensure that its colonial possessions were kept safe by keeping an eye on emerging competitors that might have challenged British power at sea. For Britain to maintain its global power, it also required carefully cultivating a global network of allies so that they would not seek alternative arrangements. And, most importantly, it required never showing weakness because the international system is predatory and weakness is blood in the water. It is hard to imagine 19th century Britain thinking that its security and prosperity would be improved by abandoning its global empire and demanding Normandy instead.

Trump’s strategic signaling and operations in “his” hemisphere will likely have two additional geopolitical ripple effects, both of them damaging. First, Trump is further alienating U.S. allies. This will almost certainly accelerate if he takes aggressive action to acquire Greenland, after which former allies are unlikely to uphold the old hegemon’s interests as keenly as they once did. Second, this retreat—obfuscated by much talk about strategic consolidation and rebuilding strength—signals to adversaries that the dominant global power is perhaps weak, wounded, and unable to sustain its global posture.

Trump’s hemisphere plan does not secure U.S. interests or consolidate its strength. On the contrary, it has the potential to create severe strategic dilemmas for the United States, as allies turn away and emboldened enemies begin to converge. The price to later regain what Trump is in the process of discarding—for example, to rebuild the alliances and global posture to prevail in a future superpower conflict—will be immeasurably higher than that of preserving Washington’s existing reach and influence.