America’s election and Israel’s wars reach a crescendo—together

WHEN MIGHT the fighting in the Middle East stop? The region is in the grip of a trio of wars that are connected yet also partly independent and dangerously unpredictable. Israel will probably attack Iran in the coming days in retaliation for its missile salvo of October 1st. Violence in Gaza continues to flare up despite the death of Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas mastermind behind the October 7th attacks. And Israel’s war in Lebanon rages on: on October 21st America’s envoy said it had “escalated out of control”.

These three theatres are playing out against a fourth factor: the American election. Some in the Biden administration may hope that a last-minute push to achieve ceasefire deals before the polls open could stop the death toll in the Middle East from mounting any further—and as a result help Kamala Harris’s election prospects. Yet Israel may also have some incentive to keep fighting: a Trump victory would probably change the strategic backdrop by giving it even more latitude.

Start with Israel’s fight with Iran, which has the potential for the greatest destruction across the region. Since Iran launched 181 ballistic missiles against Israel on October 1st—its second such attack in six months—Israel has been preparing to respond with massive force. (By contrast, when Iran attacked in April, Israel responded by taking out just one Iranian radar.) The cabinet is said to have decided last week what the targets would be, but the timing remains unknown.

The most provocative of those would be Iran’s nuclear sites or its oil terminals. America has been trying to convince Israel to aim at less strategically sensitive targets, such as Iran’s missile and drones factories. On October 18th President Joe Biden answered in the affirmative when asked if he had “a good understanding” of Israel’s plans, but refused to elaborate. Israeli and American officials believe Mr Biden and Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, have agreed that Israel will focus mainly on military targets, rather than nuclear or energy-related ones. But even this response would probably prompt Iran to launch another attack. To prepare for this, America has sent a battery of its THAAD surface-to-air missiles to bolster Israel’s missile-defence.

Details of the Israeli air-force’s preparations for a long-range strike mission may have been revealed in what appear to be leaked top-secret American intelligence documents that have been published on pro-Iran Telegram channels. Calibrating any attack—so that it hurts Iran badly but not so badly that it feels forced to escalate further—is fraught. And the range of plausible targets may still be shifting. On October 19th an explosives-laden drone blew up near Mr Netanyahu’s weekend villa in Caesarea. It was launched from Lebanon by Hizbullah, an Iran-backed militia. Iran has officially denied it had any involvement in a direct attempt on the life of Israel’s prime minister. Yet Israel sees things otherwise and could use this as justification for targeting the most valuable Iranian targets, including its leaders.

In Gaza a ceasefire remains elusive, even as the death toll continues to rise beyond 40,000. For a year the assumption of diplomats has been that a ceasefire in Gaza was the key to preventing a regional conflagration. It would feature the release of hostages and an Israeli withdrawal, which would lead to de-escalation across the entire Middle East. The Biden administration hoped that it could then yield a grand bargain to reshape the region, in which Saudi Arabia and other Sunni countries would take responsibility for the rebuilding of Gaza, and Israel and the Palestinians would commit to a two-state solution.

So far, the death of Mr Sinwar in a gunfight with an Israeli patrol on October 16th has not made any of this significantly more likely. As Hamas reels, Israel is rushing to press its advantage. It probably wants to avoid recognising the remains of the militant group as a de facto counterparty in any agreement over governing Gaza. Israel’s security establishment, including Yoav Gallant, the defence minister, says it would consider a ceasefire that allows Israel to gradually transfer control of Gaza to a Palestinian force not aligned with Hamas.

But Mr Netanyahu still rejects any deal that includes a withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor on the Gaza-Egypt border. This, he has insisted for months, is to prevent Hamas from smuggling in weapons and carrying out “more and more October 7ths”. Israeli officials have said there may be a chance to save some hostages in a deal, but the prime minister seems to want to wait until after a strike on Iran.

The third theatre is Lebanon. Although Hamas dealt Israel the most grievous blow on October 7th, Israeli strategists saw Hizbullah, much more powerful, as the bigger threat. They feared the possibility that Hizbullah could launch its own version of October 7th, on a much greater scale, and felt the need to act. In less than three months Israel has eliminated most of Hizbullah’s leadership and a significant proportion of its missile capabilities. Israeli ground forces have entered Lebanon to destroy Hizbullah’s border positions. On October 20th Israel launched a series of air-strikes against branches of Al-Qard Al-Hassan, Hizbullah’s financial network.

Israel is methodically working through Hizbullah’s capabilities and keeping open the option of expanding the war. The weaker Hizbullah gets, the more the terms of a ceasefire in Lebanon shift. Previously, Israel and mediators had been asking Hizbullah for a deal; the group’s assassinated leader, Hasan Nasrallah, had refused this as long as Israel remained in Gaza. Now Israel is insisting that a truce in Lebanon is only possible with an internationally guaranteed agreement that would stop Hizbullah from rearming on its border. It is not clear who could enforce such a deal.

One firm conclusion is that Israel is unlikely to accept ceasefires in Gaza or Lebanon until its strikes on Iran, and any Iranian counter-strike, are finished. But even then a decisive end to the mayhem is influenced by a final factor, the American election. Both candidates are already involved. Kamala Harris, as vice-president, has been on Mr Biden’s recent calls with Mr Netanyahu. Donald Trump has spoken with Mr Netanyahu as well.

Ms Harris has promised to continue Mr Biden’s unstinting support of Israel. But she has been more forceful in calling for an end to the fighting, and in acknowledging the suffering of Palestinians in Gaza. Yet it is far from clear that her victory would shorten the timeline of the Middle East’s wars. For one thing, Mr Biden would remain president until the end of January. It is conceivable that, with a Democratic victory secure, he might allow Israel even more leeway to hit Iran and its proxies; or, alternatively, that Israel might feel able to disregard the waning authority of his administration.

And what if Mr Trump wins? In the presidential debate in July, he said Israel should be allowed “to finish the job” in Gaza; on October 4th he said that Israel should strike Iran’s nuclear sites. The Middle East’s wars are hardly likely to be resolved by the time the next president is inaugurated. Instead there is a fair chance they will be the hardest problem on his or her desk. ■

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