American long-range missiles are coming back to Europe
WHEN DONALD TRUMP pulled out of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 most European states were aghast. They agreed that Russia had cheated on the cold-war pact, which prohibited all ground-based missiles (conventional and nuclear alike) with ranges between 500km and 5,500km. But they thought Mr Trump’s decision reckless and liable to start an arms race. Who in Europe would host such missiles anyway? Pretty much everyone, it turns out.
On July 10th America and Germany announced that from 2026 a trio of American medium-range missiles—all non-nuclear—would be deployed to Germany. It is the latest manifestation of the Zeitenwende (turning point) in German security policy. But it is also part of a wider resurgence of European interest in “deep-strike” capabilities, fuelled by the lessons of the war in Ukraine. That has implications for European defence industries, the military balance between NATO and Russia and the dynamics of escalation in any future war.
America plans to put three missiles in Germany. One is the 500km-plus range SM-6 ballistic missile, currently used as a ship-based anti-air weapon. The second is the 1,600km-plus range Tomahawk cruise missile, largely fired today from ships. The third and most capable is the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, also known as Dark Eagle, thought to travel a whopping 3,000km-plus. All far outstrip the longest-range land-based missile in Europe today, the 300km-range ATACMS ballistic missile.
They will not be the only such missiles in Europe. In April Emmanuel Macron, France’s president, called on allies to build Europe a deep-strike capability of its own. On July 12th France, Germany, Italy and Poland signed a letter of intent to build a cruise missile with a range of more than 1,000km. Many countries already operate similar missiles launched from planes and ships. Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland are buying 1,000km-range JASSM-ER missiles for their F-35 jets; the Dutch navy is also buying Tomahawks for its ships and subs.
This is not the first time America has stationed missiles in Europe. In the 1980s NATO’s decision to deploy medium-range nuclear-capable missiles in European countries prompted huge demonstrations. But those “Euromissiles” were meant as bargaining chips to secure the removal of Soviet ones—a gambit which succeeded with the INF Treaty in 1987. Today’s deployments are for the long haul.
German officials point to Russia’s deployment of Iskander ballistic missiles, which travel several hundred kilometres, in Kaliningrad, an exclave between Poland and Lithuania. Iskanders can carry conventional or nuclear warheads, and have been used liberally in Ukraine. “These have the capacity to reach our capital in minutes without [us] having anything to counter that,” noted Jens Plötner, foreign-policy adviser to Olaf Scholz, Germany’s chancellor, in July.
The new American long-range missiles are meant to serve as a deterrent in what Mr Plötner called the “sub-strategic domain”, ie, below full-fat nuclear weapons. If Russia attempts to coerce European allies during a war by striking cities or high-value targets, American missiles can do the same in return. The point of the French-led initiative, said Mr Plötner, was to let Europeans do this without relying on America.
In addition to such tit-for-tat deterrence, the missiles have military utility. They could target Russia’s own deep-strike missiles before those were launched at NATO, argue Jonas Schneider of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs and his colleague Torben Arnold, a lieutenant colonel in the German army. That would make life easier for NATO forces, which would otherwise be battered with missiles as they headed east.
They could also strike other targets beyond the reach of existing weaponry. Missiles positioned inside Germany would need a range of 1,600km to strike the furthest points in Russia’s Western Military District, the region from which Russia would attack NATO, note Rafael Loss and Angela Mehrer of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank.
Some of Mr Scholz’s Social Democrats are nervous that American missiles will expose the country to danger. The radical-left Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance, a significant new Russia-friendly party, vehemently opposes them. Yet this is small fry compared to the mass protests in the 1980s. The deployment “was front-page news in Germany for one day,” noted Mr Plötner.
Some strategists worry that long-range missile strikes might cause inadvertent escalation. Russia might fear that NATO could use Dark Eagle to destroy its land-based nuclear forces or take out the country’s political leadership. That could encourage Russia to strike first. Such fears are “greatly exaggerated”, argue Messrs Schneider and Arnold. There will be too few missiles for that sort of thing.
How realistic are Europe’s hopes of scaling up its own firepower? The most prolific European consumer of long-range missiles is Ukraine. It has built its own long-range “one-way attack” drones and ballistic missiles to strike targets deep inside Russia. The country’s flagship ballistic missile, the Hrim-2, was tested in August. European drone-makers are collaborating with Ukrainian firms on short-range drones. That co-operation could one day extend to longer-range ones like those which are thought to have blown up the Toropets arms depot, 500km inside Russia, on September 18th, suggests Fabian Hinz of IISS, a British think-tank.
Perhaps the more important question is whether Europeans will be able to fire their own weapons. At present, Ukraine cannot use its British-supplied Storm Shadow cruise missiles to strike complex targets in Russia. That is thought to be largely because they do best when programmed with American data, gathered from satellites and other high-value sensors. America has withheld permission for fear of escalation. If Europeans are serious about deterrence by deep strike, building the missiles is only half the challenge. ■
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