Israeli strikes on Beirut and Tehran could intensify a regional war
SEVEN HOURS and 1,500 kilometres separated the air strikes in two Middle Eastern capitals. Both were part of an Israeli operation that could lead to a dramatic escalation in a regional war which has been raging for nearly ten months.
The first, around 7.30pm local time on July 30th, targeted a flat in the southern suburbs of Beirut. Visiting the apartment was Fuad Shukr, a military adviser to the leader of Hizbullah, a Lebanese Shia militia and political party. He was killed; so were at least five civilians. A few hours later another missile hit—this time, at a nondescript home in Tehran. It killed Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas, the Palestinian Islamist movement which began the war on October 7th with a surprise attack that killed 1,200 people in Israel.
Israel’s choice of targets was both tactical and symbolic. Mr Shukr was central to Hizbullah’s military operations since its founding. He was thought to be involved in the attacks on American and French military barracks in Beirut in 1983. Israeli intelligence believes he was a critical link in shipments of Iranian guidance systems for Hizbullah’s long-range missiles.
As Hamas’s political chief, Mr Haniyeh was less involved in military matters. He is believed to have been told of the October 7th attack just minutes beforehand. Since 2017 he has been the group’s public face, based in Qatar and shuttling across the region. He was an important interlocutor in ceasefire talks with Israel.
Israel has claimed responsibility only for the Beirut strike, calling it retaliation for a rocket attack on Majdal Shams in the Golan Heights three days earlier, which killed 12 children. The rocket was almost certainly fired by Hizbullah (though the group denies it).
Since October 8th, when Hizbullah began attacking Israel in support of Hamas, both sides have mainly targeted military positions and depopulated border towns. The massacre in Majdal Shams and the killing of Mr Shukr break those unspoken rules of engagement. Both Israelis and Lebanese worry about further escalation.
Neither Israel nor Hizbullah has an interest in a wider war—but they are preparing for one. There have been reports of Hizbullah putting its long-range missiles on launchers and Israeli security officials have made it clear that, in contrast to October 7th, their forces are poised and ready for a much wider campaign.
The onus is now on Hizbullah to decide on the scale of its response. It took them more than a day to announce Mr Shukr was dead—a sign, perhaps, that they will act cautiously. A major attack on Israel could draw in America, which has deployed significant forces to the region. Lloyd Austin, the defence secretary, said on July 31st that America would “defend” Israel if it was attacked. He had spent the previous few days counselling Israel not to attack Beirut, lest it trigger a bigger conflict.
Hizbullah’s response will also be influenced by Iran, its main patron. So far Iran has not been eager to see its most powerful proxy dragged into a bigger war. That would risk squandering its decades-long investment in Hizbullah. But Israel’s decision to assassinate Mr Haniyeh on Iranian soil may change the calculus. Israel has not taken responsibility for the killing, giving the Iranians room for manoeuvre. At first Iranian officials also avoided ascribing blame. But a few hours later Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, did away with such ambiguity. Israel “martyred our dear guest in our territory”, he said.
Iran has struck Israel directly once before: it launched more than 300 missiles and drones in April, in retaliation for an Israeli strike that killed several high-ranking officers at Iran’s embassy compound in Damascus. Israel hit back with a pinpoint strike on an Iranian anti-aircraft radar, and the round was over.
This time Iran must decide whether it can risk a bigger conflagration. It is going through a sensitive political moment. Mr Haniyeh was killed hours after he attended the inauguration of Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s new president, who was elected after his predecessor was killed in a helicopter crash in May. This was probably not how he envisaged his first day on the job.
Iran has seen how its strategy of surrounding Israel with proxies has succeeded. But it has now also seen Israel strike at its most vulnerable points, from Tehran and Beirut to Hodeidah in Yemen. It has also watched a de facto coalition emerge, with an American carrier group in the Persian Gulf, an international task force in the Red Sea and even Arab regimes intercepting Iranian-made missiles launched at Israel. This has given Iran some pause.
Even as Israel, Hizbullah and Iran inch toward a wider war, Israel and Hamas had been edging towards a ceasefire agreement. Talks have been going on for months, but in recent weeks negotiators seemed guardedly optimistic that both sides would accept a framework for a staged withdrawal from Gaza and the release of 115 hostages still held there.
Two men will ultimately decide whether those talks succeed. Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, is increasingly isolated. On August 1st Israel announced it had killed Muhammad Deif, the Hamas military chief, in a strike three weeks prior. Gazans have endured immense suffering: almost 40,000 have been killed, and most of their buildings destroyed or damaged. All of this has pressed Mr Sinwar hard to make a deal. Mr Haniyeh’s assassination will delay ceasefire talks, but it will not change the underlying situation in Gaza.
Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, has been ambivalent about a deal. He has authorised talks with Hamas, through Egyptian and Qatari mediators, but has repeatedly added new conditions to Israel’s initial proposal. These include a continued Israeli presence along the border between Gaza and Egypt. Israel’s war-weary defence chiefs favour a deal, partly because they want to focus on the much bigger threat from Hizbullah. Officials involved in the talks accuse Mr Netanyahu of giving priority to politics: the far-right ministers in his government oppose any ceasefire while Hamas is still standing.
The assassinations could give Mr Netanyahu the political tailwind he needs to make a deal—if indeed he wants to. He could claim to have responded to the October 7th attack and to have brought enough retribution on Israel’s enemies: the elusive “total victory” he has promised. But before he can decide, he will need to wait for Hizbullah and Iran to respond to the assassinations—and to see whether he has a much bigger war on his hands. ■
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