Some Germans think the hostage exchange with Russia was a dirty deal

AGREEING TO free a convicted murderer was “not easy” said Olaf Scholz, Germany’s chancellor, with typical understatement. Germany would probably have preferred to play no role in the complex, multi-country deal that saw the release of Evan Gershkovich, a Wall Street Journal reporter, and 15 other prisoners from Russian and Belarusian jails. But it could not remain aloof, because Vladimir Putin was adamant about securing the release from German captivity of Vadim Krasikov, a hitman who in 2019 was sent by Russian security services to murder a Chechen exile in Berlin. Yesterday, after serving less than three years of a life sentence that he was given by a Berlin court in 2021, a tracksuited Mr Krasikov was greeted on the Moscow airport tarmac with a bearhug by Mr Putin himself.

The reaction to the swap in Germany—a proud Rechtsstaat, or state that obeys the rule of law—has been decidedly mixed. RND, a German news network, called it a “dirty deal”, and several columnists fulminated at the news. Prosecutors ordered by Germany’s Justice Ministry to release Mr Krasikov are reported to be furious. Marco Buschmann, the minister who issued the instruction, acknowledged that it was “a bitter concession”. Other politicians were yet more sceptical, warning that the release would only embolden Mr Putin and other autocrats to take more hostages.

So what persuaded Mr Scholz to free Mr Krasikov? The chancellor was motivated in part by narrow national interest. Five German citizens were among those released from captivity yesterday, including Rico Krieger, who in June had been sentenced to death in Belarus on terrorism charges. Indeed, some of them may have been arrested for the purpose of increasing pressure on Germany.

But Germany’s concession also represents the fruition of a long diplomatic effort by President Joe Biden’s administration to work closely with its most important European ally. In explaining his decision yesterday Mr Scholz said that Germany “has an obligation…to stand in solidarity with the United States”. Mr Biden, for his part, was unambiguous in his praise. “I owe a great sense of gratitude to the chancellor,” he said in the Oval Office. The German government, he added, had at first concluded “that they could not [make these concessions] because of the person in question. But everybody stepped up.”

After the diplomatic ravages of Donald Trump’s presidency, Mr Biden took office in 2021 vowing to repair America’s damaged relations with its allies. Germany was near the top of the list. Mr Biden moved quickly, striking a controversial deal with Angela Merkel, Mr Scholz’s predecessor, over Nord Stream 2, a German-backed pipeline designed to deliver Russian gas to Europe. American officials feared it would give Mr Putin economic leverage, but acknowledged that they were sacrificing their concerns for the broader goal of making nice with Germany.

In early 2022 Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine prompted Germany to abandon Nord Stream 2 anyway. But the war also provided fresh impetus for the two governments to strengthen their alliance. America was impressed by Mr Scholz’s Zeitenwende, which committed Germany to higher defence spending and an end to piped Russian gas. The two countries found themselves eye-to-eye on much else, from Ukraine’s NATO bid, which both viewed sceptically, to the conditions under which certain weapons could be delivered to Ukraine. Indeed, Mr Scholz has often seemed as motivated by the need to keep America committed in Europe as by a desire to defend Ukraine.

Both leaders have exposed themselves to domestic criticism by embracing each other so closely, notes Jeff Rathke, president of the American-German Institute at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC. Mr Scholz’s recent agreement to allow America to station medium-range missiles in Germany from 2026 has not been without controversy, notably among his fellow Social Democrats. Mr Scholz’s main opponent in next year’s federal election, Friedrich Merz of the centre-right Christian Democrats, has made a point of saying he would be able to work with Mr Trump, should he be re-elected in November. Mr Scholz, by contrast, has made little secret of his preference for a Democrat to be returned to the White House. Mrs Merkel’s relationship with Mr Trump was famously testy. Her successor would be unlikely to do much better.

Nevertheless, the strengthened diplomatic relationship proved an effective backdrop for an intense period of negotiations between the two governments, and ultimately their leaders, on the prisoner exchange. Last year America hoped that Germany could be persuaded to free Mr Krasikov as part of a deal that would lead to the release of Alexei Navalny, Russia’s most celebrated political prisoner. Although Germany’s foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, was reluctant to countenance the release of a state-sponsored assassin, Mr Scholz, who had got to know Mr Navalny during his long recuperation in Germany after his poisoning in 2020, was open to the idea. Ms Baerbock is said to have been persuaded late last year. “For you, I will do this,” Mr Scholz said to Mr Biden.

Mr Navalny’s death in a Siberian gulag in February halted negotiations, but did not scupper them. Tight-lipped in public, behind the scenes German officials let it be known that they were open to a deal that would see the release not only of Mr Gershkovich, but of prisoners of conscience such as Vladimir Kara-Murza, a Russian-British activist whose mother had moved to Berlin to lobby for her son’s freedom. German spooks began to speak directly to their Russian counterparts. The good relations between senior American and German officials established during the war smoothed the passage of the talks, and the details were finalised last month at the Aspen Security Forum, a talk-fest in Colorado. “Germany is Europe’s indispensable nation, and the Biden administration recognised that from day one,” says Mr Rathke. “That is why Germany has been willing to play a central role in these extremely sensitive negotiations.”

Once the hostages had been released, Mr Biden placed himself at the centre of the deal, publicly greeting Mr Gershkovich and others when they landed at Andrews Air Force Base. Yet Mr Scholz, an unpopular chancellor who could do with a political boost, was more reticent. The chancellor was present at Cologne-Bonn airport for the arrival of several of the former prisoners, including Mr Kara-Murza, but restricted himself to a short statement and was not filmed meeting them. That probably reflects Germans’ ambivalence over the deal. The criticism will not die down quickly. ■

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