Israel’s army adopts a high-stakes new strategy: more terrain
THE SECOND stage of the ceasefire in Gaza, in which Israel and Hamas were to officially end the war there, was supposed to start on March 2nd. But Israel has declined to begin the talks to which it committed in a deal in January. It is demanding an extension to the first stage of the truce, during which it wants Hamas to release more of the 59 hostages whom the militants still hold. To put pressure on Hamas to agree to the modified agreement, Israel has cut off supplies of aid to the war-ravaged strip.
The stalling of the ceasefire is part of a wider strategic shift, as Israel’s army seeks to maintain a larger geographic presence, including in territory that is not Israeli. It has begun to create what it intends to be indefinite “buffer zones” on four fronts: in Gaza, on the borders with Lebanon and Syria, and in the West Bank.
The move is driven by chaos in these places, the lingering trauma of Hamas’s attack in October 2023 and by pressure from right-wing parties in the governing coalition of Binyamin Netanyahu, the prime minister. It is underpinned by Mr Netanyahu’s apparent confidence that he has the backing of the Trump administration, which has shown no signs of trying to rein in Israel’s army.
The Gaza truce is not the only ceasefire agreement with Israel that is breaking down. Under the terms of an American-brokered agreement with Hizbullah, the Shia movement that controlled parts of Lebanon until its war with Israel last year, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) was supposed to leave Lebanese territory by late January. Israel demanded an extension until the Lebanese army had completed its takeover of the area. But even after that deadline passed on February 18th, Israel remained in five fortified positions in southern Lebanon.
Israel justifies the delay by claiming a need to protect Israeli communities near the border. A return of Hizbullah forces to the south could easily put them at risk again. The government says the IDF will vacate the posts once they are confident the Lebanese army can secure the border and keep Hizbullah out (it is not clear yet if they are up to the job). Israel has neither set a date nor defined the conditions for confidence.
Further to the east, on the Golan Heights, Israel’s ceasefire with Syria is breaking down too. The deal was struck with the regime of Hafez al-Assad in 1974. When Syrian opposition forces overthrew his son, Bashar, in December, Israeli forces crossed the border on the Golan and occupied Syrian territory. Israel’s original justification was the lack of a recognised force to protect the border. Since then, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) movement has established a government in Damascus, but it does not have firm control of the country and rival armed groups are active.
Partly as a result the IDF has begun to build permanent positions in Syria. On February 23rd Mr Netanyahu said that Israel “will not allow HTS forces or the new Syrian army to enter the area south of Damascus”. He demanded a “complete demilitarisation of southern Syria in the provinces of Quneitra, Daraa and Suwayda from the forces of the new regime.”
Lastly, Israeli troops have eschewed past agreements in the Palestinian cities of Jenin and Tulkarm in the West Bank, where an estimated 40,000 civilians have been forced to leave their homes due to ongoing Israeli operations against armed groups there. The cities are part of “Area A”, control of which was allotted to the Palestinian Authority under the Oslo II agreement signed in 1995. On January 29th Israel Katz, the Israeli defence minister, said that “after the completion of the operation, IDF forces will remain in the camp to ensure that terror does not return”.
Israeli security officials say that the events of the past 17 months have meant the country has to adopt what one calls “a different strategy of risk management”. This means Israel will act based not on what its intelligence services assess its enemies are planning in the short term, but on their potential capabilities. For now, the expanded IDF footprint may be sustainable and avoid a serious backlash. Hizbullah and Hamas are at a low ebb following Israel’s devastating campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon. The HTS government in Damascus has other priorities as it tries to avoid a meltdown of the Syrian economy and the country descending into anarchy or civil war.
The most immediate concern is Gaza. Hamas may have little interest in resuming the war while it regains civilian control of the coastal strip and rebuilds its battered fighting force. But if the group continues to refuse to change the terms of the agreement, Israel is preparing a massive new offensive in Gaza. Israeli officers say that could pave the way for the plan, first announced by Donald Trump, to remove Gaza’s population and build the “Riviera” of the Middle East. No decision is expected until Mr Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, returns to the region in pursuit of a new deal. Yet the risk of reigniting the war looks real.
There are longer-term costs, too. In southern Lebanon, Israel’s continued presence gives Hizbullah an excuse to keep its military capabilities despite pressure from the new Lebanese government and the public to disarm. For Israel, the burden of maintaining this more expansive presence will be high, both in financial terms and in keeping up mobilisation levels among reservists, many of whom are into their fourth months-long stint of duty since the war in Gaza began. It is also contingent on continued support from the notoriously fickle Trump administration.
The IDF’s larger footprint could also endanger a unique set of opportunities for Israel. Since signing its first treaty with an Arab country, Egypt, in 1978, Israel has balanced military deterrence with diplomatic manoeuvring. That treaty, and another with Jordan, have survived events in the region. The new governments in Syria and Lebanon are anxious to engage with the West and to prove that they are no longer havens for pro-Iranian proxies. Continued occupation of their territory may not be the best start to improving relations. ■