Operating in Myanmar’s Kayin state in the spring, Maung Phyo’s unit made steady progress against the pro-democracy forces arrayed against the military regime, pushing deeper into rebel territory despite facing a daily barrage of drone strikes, artillery attacks, and land mines.
But Maung Phyo was not a willing soldier: The 25-year-old said that he was abducted at gunpoint last December by the Myanmar military while harvesting rice at a farm 500 miles away. During basic training, his hair was shaved and his personal belongings were confiscated before he was given a military uniform and an identification number.
The Myanmar military seized power in a coup nearly five years ago, plunging the country into a massive civil war as new pro-democracy forces teamed up with veteran ethnic armed groups that had long fought for autonomy in the country’s borderlands. Throughout the conflict, the military has been accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the recent bombing of a political demonstration in rebel territory that killed at least 24 people, including children.
After suffering unexpectedly heavy battlefield losses in late 2023 and early 2024, the military enacted a conscription policy in February 2024, sending the first batch of new soldiers to training in April. At the time, some analysts predicted that such forced recruitment would backfire, pushing more young people to join Myanmar’s resistance forces or even to undermine the military from within.
Instead, conscription appears to have been one major factor—along with increased political support from China—in reversing the momentum of the conflict in Myanmar back in the military regime’s favor. As of November, the military has drafted 17 batches of between 4,000 and 5,000 new recruits such as Maung Phyo.
“The military’s conscription plan turns out to be successful,” said political analyst Min Zaw Oo, who added that instead of a high desertion rate, many new recruits have received field promotions. He said that the first two batches of conscripts were filled with military supporters to ensure loyalty, while later rounds seemed to prey on the economically vulnerable.
“They have already filled the ranks they lost during post-coup fighting. But they still need more conscripts to make the units close to standard battalions,” Min Zaw Oo said, referring to the relatively small size of Myanmar’s battalions.
During an interview in Thailand last month, Maung Phyo said he had met other recruits who were abducted as well as those more formally drafted into the military, but he added that many others were men from poor families who were paid by other conscripts to take their places. These payments are often recurring, incentivizing Myanmar’s poorest to remain in uniform.
The military seemed to adapt its tactics after October 2023, when it suffered major defeats at the hands of a trio of ethnic armed groups known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which launched a stunning offensive that reshaped the contours of the conflict. The rebel alliance—whose constituent groups also engage in forced recruitment—seized swaths of territory in northern Shan state, on Myanmar’s border with China, and in far western Rakhine state.
Maung Phyo described an intensive and often brutal training regimen for conscripts. During the first three months, new recruits practiced parade formations, weapons handling (including assault rifles, carbines, grenades and landmines), and tactical exercises such as simulating night combat. This was followed by two weeks of advanced combat training before being deployed to the front lines.
Physical abuse was common, according to Maung Phyo, with whole dormitories collectively disciplined for the mistakes of one trainee. Two recruits with intellectual disabilities were routinely abused, he said.
His account echoes a condemnation last year by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Parliamentarians for Human Rights group: “This brutal practice, involving abductions, threats, and violence, not only deprives young people of their agency but also coerces them to take part in a war that is in clear violation of international humanitarian law,” the organization wrote in a statement in December.
In recent months, the military has mounted a major counteroffensive across Myanmar, reversing opposition gains in multiple theaters, including in Kayin state. Some rebel-held territory visited by Foreign Policy last year, including the town of Thin Gan Nyi Naung and a stretch of the Asian Highway, are now back in regime hands.
Maung Pyo said that in his unit of roughly 250 soldiers, only 21 were new conscripts, suggesting that units are not overly reliant on conscripts—making it more difficult for those forcibly recruited to escape or shirk duties. Still, Maung Phyo managed to get in touch with the Karen National Union (KNU), Myanmar’s oldest ethnic armed group, which has long been a core member of the broader pro-democracy movement. He reported his unit’s movements to the KNU until the group helped him desert and flee to Thailand.
The conscription policy has led to a massive influx of young men into neighboring Thailand, which is now home to around 4 million Myanmar nationals, a significant number of whom are undocumented. Thailand has been more welcoming to nationals from Myanmar than other countries; a similar influx of ethnic Chin refugees from Myanmar into northeast India contributed to ethnic clashes in 2023.
But life is far from easy for these immigrants, particularly as their increasing numbers test the limits of Thailand’s tolerance. Migrants from Myanmar often have trouble securing proper documentation and are prevented from traveling beyond the Thai border town of Mae Sot; police extortion is routine.
When Thit Paing was registered for the conscription lottery, he said that he decided not to test his luck and fled to Mae Sot in May 2024. But once he arrived, he said that he was fined 6,000 baht ($185) for driving a motorbike without a license, far more than the typical rate of 500 baht ($15). He struggled to find work while a heavy security presence in town contributed to a constant air of anxiety.
Eventually, Thit Paing joined a pro-democracy rebel group across the border in Kayin state. “I’ve been living in fear and running out of places to hide from state brutality,” he said.
Though conscription may have pushed some more young men to join the resistance, manpower for those fighting the junta has never been a problem: Since the coup, rebel leaders have reported having far more soldiers than guns. Indeed, many groups are suffering from a shortage of weapons and ammunition. Wary of the resistance movement and growing instability, Beijing has heaped pressure on the armed groups along its border with Myanmar to distance themselves from the pro-democracy groups.
In Myanmar, forced recruitment has therefore replenished the military’s ranks while it fights an enemy with one hand now tied behind its back.