Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to China in August, followed by New Delhi’s decision to resume issuing visas to Chinese citizens and the gradual restoration of direct flights between the two countries, has set in motion yet another loop in India-China relations. This recurring pattern—alternating between optimism and confrontation—has replayed itself for decades. The latest loop may well follow the same trajectory, ending once again in border skirmishes or diplomatic friction. Unless both sides develop a credible mechanism to address the boundary dispute and manage their deep strategic mistrust, this looping dynamic will continue to define the relationship, trapping Asia’s two largest nations in cycles of renewal and relapse.
The unresolved border dispute, spanning three contested sectors in the Himalayas, remains at the heart of these looping tensions. Tibet—particularly questions surrounding the Dalai Lama’s role and succession—adds another layer of strain. The triangular relationship between India, Pakistan, and China further deepens mistrust, already amplified by rising Chinese and Indian nationalism. Together, these factors have made it increasingly difficult to revive the spirit of the Panchsheel Agreement, which delineated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence between India and China, signed more than 70 years ago.
Since the 1962 Sino-Indian border war effectively shattered that spirit, India and China have struggled to rebuild genuine trust. Every apparent breakthrough, whether in border negotiations, confidence-building measures, expanding trade, or carefully choreographed photo-ops between leaders, has sooner or later unraveled into renewed confrontation. Before the deadly Galwan Valley clashes of 2020, there was the Doklam standoff in 2017; before that, Sumdorong Chu in 1986-87. Each episode has marked yet another turn in the weary loop of engagement and hostility. The financial and human costs of maintaining constant vigilance along the disputed frontier continue to mount and will persist despite the recent, tentative easing of bilateral tensions.
The years of diplomatic paralysis that followed Galwan serve as a stark reminder that without a genuine commitment to dialogue and compromise, this loop of confrontation and fragile reconciliation will only tighten further. The cycle will persist until both nations move beyond the tactical management of border tensions and achieve a mutually accepted agreement on boundary demarcation—one that finally closes the loop, rather than beginning it anew.
It may be time to fundamentally rethink how India and China conduct their negotiations. After decades of repetitive dialogue producing little more than temporary calm, the process itself has become part of the loop. A drastic change is needed—perhaps even the inclusion of a third party in the discussions. While both sides are likely to resist external mediation, such a step may be essential, as neither government can afford the domestic backlash that would accompany meaningful compromise—the only real path to resolution. In the aftermath of the 1962 war, British philosopher Bertrand Russell’s Peace Foundation attempted to mediate between India’s Jawaharlal Nehru and China’s Zhou Enlai. That effort failed, largely due to the inexperience of the mediators. What is required now is a neutral country, free of military ambitions and acceptable to the peoples of both India and China. Singapore is well positioned to serve that role: a small yet trusted actor in an increasingly intricate Asian landscape, one that has been further complicated by global uncertainties arising from current U.S. policy directions.
Before any proposal for third-party mediation can be seriously considered, India and China must first make meaningful gestures to (re)build mutual trust and confidence. The initial onus lies with China. The psychological scar of the 1962 war—widely perceived in India as an act of betrayal—remains deep and has been passed down through generations. Each new border standoff only deepens that wound, making reconciliation harder. Beijing could take the first step toward healing by supporting India’s long-standing bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. It would echo Nehru’s own decision, even after the 1962 conflict, to back the People’s Republic of China’s claim to that same council. A gesture of this magnitude would not only honor that history but also serve as a powerful act of goodwill—one capable of transforming suspicion into the beginnings of trust.
India, for its part, must also take tangible steps to reduce mistrust. It should reopen its doors to Chinese tourists, scholars, and businesses. For years, Chinese nationals have faced significant hurdles in obtaining visas, and Chinese companies continue to be viewed with suspicion. Diplomatic rhetoric often invokes the “ancient civilizational ties” between the two nations, yet the restrictive policies toward Chinese visitors and investors tell a different story. Genuine confidence building or progress on the border issue is impossible in an atmosphere clouded by such suspicion. Reengagement at the level of people, ideas, and commerce is essential if both countries are to break free from their enduring loop of distrust.
At the same time, shifting global dynamics—particularly the uncertainty surrounding U.S. trade and foreign policy under the Trump administration—may present an unexpected opening for India and China to recalibrate their relationship. The imposition of tariffs, the unpredictability of Washington’s stance toward both countries, and the weakening of multilateral institutions have altered the strategic calculus in Asia. Rather than viewing each other solely through the prism of competition, New Delhi and Beijing could seize this moment to develop a more mature, pragmatic, and mutually beneficial partnership. A cooperative approach, grounded in economic complementarity and regional stability, could lay the foundation for addressing the border dispute, with or without the mediation of a third party.
Breaking the loop that has long defined India-China relations will require more than diplomatic protocol or symbolic handshakes. It demands bold, strong gestures of trust, each side taking a step that defies domestic cynicism but signals genuine intent. Whether through China’s support for India’s global aspirations or India’s reopening to Chinese people and businesses, only acts of political imagination can replace suspicion with dialogue. The alternative is to remain trapped in the same weary cycle of hope and hostility, a loop that both nations can ill afford to repeat yet again.
This essay is published in cooperation with the Asian Peace Programme at the National University of Singapore’s Asia Research Institute.