Israeli strikes in Beirut and Tehran could intensify a regional war
SEVEN HOURS and 1,500 kilometres separated the air strikes in two Middle Eastern capitals. Both were part of an Israeli operation that could lead to a dramatic escalation in a regional war which has been raging for nearly ten months.
The first, around 7.30pm local time on July 30th, targeted a flat in the southern suburbs of Beirut. Fuad Shukr, a military adviser to the leader of Hizbullah, a Lebanese Shia militia and political party, was visiting the apartment. His fate is still unclear; at least four civilians were killed in the strike, and dozens wounded. A few hours later another missile hit—this time, at a nondescript home in Tehran. It killed Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas, the Palestinian Islamist movement which began the war on October 7th with a surprise attack that killed 1,200 people in Israel.
Israel’s choice of targets was both tactical and symbolic. Mr Shukr was central to Hizbullah’s military operations since its founding in the early 1980s. He was thought to be involved in the attacks on American and French military barracks in Beirut in 1983. Israeli intelligence believes he was a critical link in shipments of Iranian guidance systems for Hizbullah’s long-range missiles.
As the head of Hamas’s politburo, Mr Haniyeh was less involved in military matters. He is believed to have been notified of the October 7th attack just minutes before it took place. Since 2017 he has been the group’s public face, based in Qatar and shuttling across the region. He led an effort to mend the group’s ties with Iran after their rift during the Syrian civil war, when Hamas spoke out against Bashar al-Assad (who was propped up by both Iran and Hizbullah). He was also an important interlocutor in ceasefire talks with Israel.
Details are still vague, but both assassinations seem to have been carried out by long-range missiles launched by Israeli fighter jets. Israel has only claimed responsibility for the Beirut strike, calling it retaliation for a rocket strike on Majdal Shams, in the Golan Heights three days earlier which killed 12 children. The rocket was almost certainly fired by Hizbullah as part of a larger barrage (though the group denies it was to blame).
Since October 8th, when Hizbullah began attacking Israel in support of Hamas, both sides have mainly targeted military positions and depopulated border towns. The massacre in Majdal Shams, and the attempted killing of Mr Shukr, both break those unspoken rules of engagement, and both Israelis and Lebanese are worried about further escalation.
Neither Israel nor Hizbullah have an interest in a wider war—but they are preparing for one. There have been reports of Hizbullah positioning its long-range missiles on launchers and Israeli security officials have made it clear that, unlike on October 7th, their forces are poised and ready for a much wider campaign.
The onus is now on Hizbullah to decide on the scale of its response. They have yet to confirm whether Mr Shukr is alive or dead—a sign, perhaps, that they will act cautiously. A major attack on Israel could draw in America, which has deployed significant forces to the region. Lloyd Austin, the defence secretary, said on July 31st that America would “defend” Israel if it was attacked. He had spent the previous few days counselling Israel not to attack Beirut, lest it trigger a bigger conflict.
Hizbullah’s response will also be influenced by Iran, its main patron. So far Iran has not been eager to see its most powerful proxy dragged into a bigger war. That would risk squandering its decades-long investment in Hizbullah. But Israel’s choice to assassinate Mr Haniyeh on Iranian soil may change the calculus. Israel has not taken responsibility for the killing, giving the Iranians room for manoeuvre. At first Iranian officials also avoided ascribing blame. But a few hours later Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, did away with such ambiguity: Israel “martyred our dear guest in our territory”, he said.
Iran has struck Israel directly once before: it launched more than 300 missiles and drones at Israel in April, retaliation for an Israeli strike that killed several high-ranking officers at Iran’s embassy compound in Damascus. Israel hit back with a pinpoint strike on an Iranian anti-aircraft radar, and the round was over.
This time, Iran will have to decide whether it can risk a bigger conflagration. It is going through a sensitive political moment. Mr Haniyeh was killed hours after he attended the inauguration of Masoud Pezeshkian, the new Iranian president, who was elected after his predecessor was killed in a helicopter crash in May. This was probably not how he envisioned his first day on the job.
Even as Israel, Hizbullah and Iran inch toward a wider war, Israel and Hamas had been edging towards a ceasefire agreement.Talks have been going on for months, but in recent weeks negotiators seemed guardedly optimistic that both sides would accept a framework, initially proposed by Israel, for a staged withdrawal from Gaza and the release of 115 hostages still held there.
Two men will ultimately decide whether those talks succeed. Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, is increasingly isolated. Israel has killed a number of senior Hamas commanders in Gaza. In recent weeks it has also rescued three hostages, and located the bodies of five dead ones. Gazans have endured immense suffering: almost 40,000 have been killed, and Israeli bombardment has damaged or destroyed most of Gaza’s buildings and infrastructure.
All of this has put Mr Sinwar under enormous pressure to make a deal: the Palestinian public is desperate for a ceasefire, and his leverage with Israel is dwindling as the number of living hostages continues to fall. Mr Haniyeh’s assassination will certainly delay the ceasefire talks, but it will not change the underlying situation in Gaza.
Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, has been ambivalent about a deal. He has authorised talks with Hamas, through Egyptian and Qatari mediators, but has repeatedly added new conditions to Israel’s initial proposal. These include a continued Israeli presence along the border between Gaza and Egypt. Israel’s war-weary defence chiefs are in favour of a deal, partly because they want to focus on the much bigger threat from Hizbullah. Officials involved in the talks accuse Mr Netanyahu of giving priority to political considerations: the far-right ministers in his government oppose any ceasefire while Hamas is still standing.
The assassinations in Beirut and Tehran could give Mr Netanyahu the political tailwind he needs to make a deal—if indeed he wants to. He could claim to have responded to the October 7th attack and brought retribution on Israel’s enemies, the elusive “total victory” he has promised Israelis. But before he can decide, he will need to wait for Hizbullah and Iran to respond to the assassinations—and to see whether he has a much bigger war on his hands.■