Senegal’s democracy hangs by a thread
JUST WEEKS ahead of a planned presidential election in Senegal, on February 3rd President Macky Sall called it off. The move has sparked a constitutional crisis and dealt a blow to democracy across west Africa. Much of the opposition has reacted with fury. Khalifa Sall (no relation), a leading opponent, decried what he called “a constitutional coup”. Another candidate, Thierno Alassane Sall (also no relation), called it “high treason”.
Senegal has long been seen as a pillar of stability and democracy in west Africa. Unlike many other countries in the region it has avoided civil wars and coups, and has held a series of largely peaceful and democratic transitions of power. Until now, it has never delayed a presidential election. And in a region hit by a spate of coups, Mr Sall has played a leading role in the attempts by ECOWAS, the regional bloc, to push juntas back towards democracy. His message has sometimes been undermined by a sharp decline in freedom in Senegal itself. And now the country’s democracy appears to be in grave danger.
Mr Sall has offered no indication of when the elections, originally scheduled for February 25th, may be held. He has instead proposed a “national dialogue” to create the “conditions for a free, transparent and inclusive election”. Yet Mr Sall held such a dialogue just months ago.
The postponement followed weeks of political rumbling—and a brawl in the National Assembly— over alleged corruption in the Constitutional Council, the judicial body that determines whether candidates have met the conditions required to run. Last month the council disqualified several opposition figures.
Mr Sall justified his move by saying time was needed to resolve a dispute between the Constitutional Council and some members of the National Assembly. In January the council controversially barred Ousmane Sonko, the leading opposition candidate, on the basis of his defamation conviction. Mr Sonko, who is in jail on separate charges of fomenting insurrection, says the cases against him are politically motivated. The council has also blocked Karim Wade, the son of a former president, from running. Mr Wade’s political party, which made the allegations of corruption towards the council, urged a six-month delay to the presidential election to give time for an inquiry. (The council denies any wrongdoing among its members.)
Surprisingly, Mr Sall appeared sympathetic. This raised the possibility of a split between him and Amadou Ba, the prime minister and the ruling party’s presidential candidate. Last week the National Assembly voted to open a parliamentary inquiry into the Constitutional Council, a move supported by the ruling party’s MPs. Mr Ba has not yet reacted, but rumours swirl in Dakar, the capital, about his possible resignation.
The constitution requires elections to be held at least 30 days before the end of the incumbent president’s mandate: Mr Sall’s expires on April 2nd. And the decree announcing an election date must be issued 80 days before the vote takes place. A crisis therefore looms. “The mandate is quite clear in the constitution,” says Gilles Yabi of WATHI, a think-tank in Dakar. “It should not be the president who will decide on postponing the election.”
Mr Sall now seems certain to breach the constitution. Unless, that is, his government manages to change it: a proposed exemption to the constitution, for a six-month delay, is already in the works. Critics fear that this, if successful, could be repeated to delay the poll further. The American government says it is “deeply concerned”; its embassy warned of violent protests.
What is Mr Sall up to? He claims to be defending democracy, warning that the dispute between judges and MPs “could seriously harm the credibility of the election”. Yet he is unconvincing as a democratic saviour—and not just because postponing an election indefinitely is a curious way of defending democracy.
His government was first accused of politicising the justice system in 2019, when Mr Wade and another opposition figure were disqualified as presidential candidates. On occasion Mr Sall’s administration has simply ignored the law in its zest to exclude Mr Sonko. (Mr Sall denies any wrongdoing.) The president also flirted with running for a third term, seemingly in breach of the constitution, before ruling it out in July last year. Worse, since early 2021 at least 45 Senegalese have been killed in various protests backing Mr Sonko.
Given all this, some Senegalese fear Mr Sall is up to no good. One theory is that he fears Mr Ba will lose and so is delaying the election, perhaps to propose a different candidate. Another is that he wants to cling to power himself. It seems almost certain that he will remain in office beyond the end of his mandate. Some think he may even go back on his word not to run for a third term. In his speech postponing the election Mr Sall reiterated that he would not run. But that has not quelled the doubts.
Satisfaction with democracy in Senegal has declined sharply under Mr Sall. According to Afrobarometer, a pollster, in 2013, just after Mr Sall took office, more than two-thirds of Senegalese were fairly or very satisfied with democracy. By 2022 less than half were.
That places Senegal at the sharp end of a wider decline of faith in democracy in Africa, and a growing appetite for military rule. A coup was once unthinkable in Senegal. No longer. “If the army takes power tonight, it will be the president’s fault,” wrote Ousmane Diallo of Amnesty International, a watchdog, on X. No matter what happens next, west Africa’s democratic nightmare is far from over.■