The people and places that turned away from the BJP

“Ab ki baar, 400 paar.” This time, more than 400 seats. That was the campaign slogan of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its allies ahead of India’s election. Yet in the end they fell far short, winning just 293. The BJP itself suffered a 63-seat loss, taking its tally from 303 to 240, below the 272 needed for a majority. Where did it all go wrong?

It is not that the BJP’s popularity has fallen across the board. Its overall share of the national vote declined only fractionally, from 37.3% to 36.5% (see chart 1). In the south, in the past a weak spot for the BJP where it was hoping to make headway this time, its vote share did in fact rise markedly. But in its heartland, the Hindi-speaking states of the north, its vote share fell. And whereas its increased support in the south was not enough to win it any extra seats there, its decline in the north cost it dearly (see chart 2). In effect, the BJP’s vote was unchanged, but much less efficiently distributed. In 2019 its 37% share of the vote won it 56% of the seats; this time a similar showing yielded only 44% of seats.

The north accounts for the vast majority of the BJP’s underperformance. The party won 55 fewer seats in the region than in 2019. Its steepest decline was in Uttar Pradesh, the country’s biggest and most politically important state. In 2019 the BJP swept 62 of the state’s 80 seats with 50% of the vote; this time those figures fell to 33 and 41% respectively.

The increase in the BJP’s share of the vote in the south was substantial: it jumped from 18% to 24%. This was the reflection of a determined push to make the BJP a truly national party, with lots of spending and visits from grandees devoted to the region. But under India’s first-past-the-post electoral system, the BJP’s improved standing did not translate into a single extra seat.

Elsewhere the BJP’s performance was patchy. In the east, gains in the state of Odisha were largely offset by losses in West Bengal. In the west the BJP’s support held up in Gujarat but slipped in neighbouring Maharashtra. The lack of a national trend may reflect the failure of the BJP to frame the election around a single, galvanising theme. In 2019 Mr Modi had just sent fighter jets to bomb Pakistan, in retaliation for a terrorist attack in the part that India controls of the disputed territory of Kashmir. This show of force unleashed nationalist fervour, which probably boosted the BJP across the country.

The anti-Muslim rhetoric which Mr Modi relied on this time does not seem to have been as potent a rallying cry. Many voters, especially in rural areas, named unemployment and inflation as the most pressing issues. What is more, many lower-caste voters seem to have worried that the BJP might roll back popular affirmative-action policies. At any rate, the BJP won only 44% of rural seats, down from 58% in 2019. And in places with high numbers of lower-caste voters, the BJP’s share of seats fell by nearly half from 50% in 2019.

The BJP may also have been punished for its no-holds-barred approach to politics in several states. In Maharashtra it had conspired to seize control of the state government in 2022 by persuading biddable factions in two big local parties to defect. The two breakaway factions contested the election as parties allied to the BJP—and were thumped. The BJP-led alliance lost more than half its seats. Voters seemed to deliver a similar message in the state of Jharkhand, where in January national authorities arrested Hemant Soren, the chief minister and an opponent of the BJP. He claimed the corruption allegations against him were politically motivated; the BJP retorted that his government was a club of thieves. Voters seem to have taken his side: the BJP lost three seats in the state.

The other big factor in the BJP’s downfall was the cannier tactics of the opposition, led by the Congress party. Together with dozens of regional parties, it formed the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA). Before the election the big-tent group was derided as lacking identity, organisation and political nous. But unlike in past elections, it struck sensible seat-sharing deals that helped prevent the fracturing of the opposition vote in states like Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra. Even in places without such arrangements, the BJP’s many rivals deferred to one another more often, reducing the number of races where opposition parties competed against one another. In West Bengal, for instance, Congress bowed out of several races, helping a local party, the Trinamool Congress, to increase its seat count to 29, up from 22. In general, Congress was rewarded for narrowing its focus. In 2019 it contested in 423 seats but won only 55. This time it competed in just 328 but managed to win 99, with a higher average margin to boot.

But savvier tactics will get the opposition only so far. Congress’s overall share of the vote barely rose, from 19.4% to 21%. The BJP remains far and away India’s most popular party, with almost double Congress’s popular support and more than double its seats. The BJP’s vote share this time was higher than Congress has achieved in any election since 1989. Mr Modi may have lost his air of invincibility, but his party retains a commanding position. ■

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