How much of a difference will Ukraine’s new F-16s make?
BETTER LATE than never. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, has been pleading for F-16 fighter jets. The first ten (of an eventual 79) arrived in Ukraine on the last day of July, a year after the reluctant Biden administration finally gave its more eager European allies the green light to send them. By the end of 2024, Ukraine should be flying 20 of the American-made fighter jets. The rest, promised by the so-called F-16 coalition led by Denmark and the Netherlands, will arrive in batches during 2025.
Frustration about how long it has taken to get the aircraft to Ukraine is intense, says Ben Hodges, a former commander of American forces in Europe. One reason for the delay in providing sufficient numbers of F-16s to make an impact, he says, is a “pitiful” lack of training slots for Ukrainian pilots–a “policy decision by the administration”. Language difficulties have also contributed. Ukraine has excellent, battle-hardened pilots. But F-16s, even these relatively old ones, are both very different and more complex than the Soviet-era Mig-29s and Sukhoi-27s they are used to.
Another factor has been the time needed to get the infrastructure in place to receive them. The aircraft requires more maintenance than its Russian equivalents. Flight engineers need as much training as the pilots (even though some Western civilian contractors are almost certainly on the ground in Ukraine). Some repair and maintenance may also be carried out in the neighbouring NATO countries of Poland and Romania, which will infuriate Russia.
The incoming aircraft are a priority target for the Russians, says Nico Lange, a former chief of staff in Germany’s defence ministry. This is why they have been deployed with a great deal of secrecy, in dispersed bases with underground or hardened shelters, along with decoys. But such dispersal makes the logistics harder: it requires more people and more spare parts.
How much difference will the F-16s actually make? Douglas Barrie, an expert on air power at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, thinks the main immediate value is a boost to morale. The initial numbers are small, and the Ukrainians will use them cautiously to avoid losses that would give Russia a propaganda victory. But they should start to make an incremental difference.
According to reports, America is equipping the F-16s with advanced air-to-air missiles (such as the long-range version of the AIM-120 and the AIM-9X, the newest version of the Sidewinder) as well as high-speed anti-radiation missiles. They will be able to carry up to four GBU-39 glide bombs (basically a shell with stubby wings that can be launched from a plane) which, while smaller than their Russian equivalents, are far more accurate and longer-range. They can also carry cluster munitions to be used against troops and armoured formations. Upgraded radars are reportedly on the way.
The F-16s could lessen the impunity with which Russian Su-34s have been pummelling Ukraine’s front lines. The Russians have been launching more than a hundred crude but effective glide-bombs every day without having to leave Russian airspace. A priority, says Mr Lange, will be to force Russian pilots to stay further back or risk being shot down. The AIM-120D is an all-weather missile with its own active radar that is thought to have a range of up to 180km (112 miles), though when the target takes evasive action the missile must twist and turn, reducing its range.
The F-16s can use cheaper heat-seeking AIM-9X missiles to take down the cruise missiles that have been crippling Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. Their 20mm six-barrel Gatling gun should be effective against Russia’s slow-moving Geran drones, copies of the Iranian Shahed. F-16s could also fire Harpoon anti-ship missiles against the remainder of Russia’s Black Sea fleet.
But with numbers building up slowly, it may take some time before the F-16s can have much impact. A recent report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), another think-tank, argues that Ukraine needs many more aircraft than have so far been promised. Of the 79 committed, at least ten are two-seat trainers. Some of the others may be in such poor condition as to serve mainly as a source of spare parts. Ukraine may have enough for just three to four squadrons. The report argues that it needs 12 squadrons or more with 18 planes per squadron to achieve local air superiority and support a ground offensive.
Ukraine has been pleased by French and Swedish offers of Mirage and Gripen fighter jets. But because of the advantages of flying a single type of aircraft, it would much rather get more F-16s. Seth Jones of CSIS says Ukraine may be able to bridge the numbers gap by teaming F-16s with home-made “wingman” drones. Ukraine is building increasingly capable drones of all kinds, and using them in innovative ways.
It will take time to integrate the F-16s with Ukraine’s air-defence systems and to acquire operating experience. Co-ordinating aircraft flying from multiple airfields will be challenging, says General Hodges. One key to unlocking their potential is the ASC 890 control and surveillance aircraft; in May Sweden announced it was donating two of them. But it is not clear when Ukrainian crews will be ready to fly them.
Still, the F-16s’ arrival marks the start of building a NATO-standard air force. It plugs Ukraine into the F-16’s well-developed supply chain. NATO weapons systems such as Storm Shadow/Scalp missiles will be far more effective when carried by a plane they were designed for, rather than lashed on to elderly MiGs and Sukhois. Ukraine’s F-16s also come equipped with Link-16, a NATO tactical data-link that allows secure communications and improved situational awareness. Too few and too late though they may be, the F-16s’ importance should not be underestimated.■
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