The rise of the hard right threatens Europe’s political stability

Voters in America are often asked by politicians if they are better off now than they were four years ago. As they look forward to European elections on June 6th-9th, their transatlantic counterparts would probably rather not delve much into the five years since they last trudged to the polls. The European Union has had a half-decade to forget. Eight months after the vote in May 2019 the bloc lost a member for the first time in its six-decade history when Britain left. Weeks later covid-19 hit. The continent emerged from lockdown to face war on its doorstep and an energy crisis that has laid its economy flat and boosted the fortunes of xenophobic parties.

Those assuming things can only get better may be in for a reckoning. Yes, Brexit has been dealt with, energy prices are lower and the pandemic a blurring memory. But the war in Ukraine endures and the hard right of Marine Le Pen in France or Viktor Orban in Hungary is gaining ever more ground. Worse, the probable outcome of the election will be a period of political rudderlessness. At best, its 27 national leaders and the EU’s central institutions will spend months focused on internal machinations, such as who gets what job in Brussels. At worst, rows about the future direction of the EU could last past the end of the year—leaving a political vacuum there, even as a putative Trump administration prepares for office.

Distant as the EU may seem to the average voter, what happens in Brussels matters: the bloc’s approach to industrial policy, defence, the environment and much else beside is crafted there. And if the union lacks clear leadership, it is not just its 450m citizens that will feel the impact. Ukraine still depends on its European allies for money and weapons: nobody would enjoy seeing the EU politically logjammed as much as Russia’s Vladimir Putin. And whoever wins the White House in November, Europe is now the sole global bloc that is still supporting free-trade rules at a time when China and America have all but forsaken them. Should the EU give up on its carbon-cutting ambitions, as Europe’s populists generally demand, a terrible signal would be sent to the rest of the world.

The irony is that so much has come to rest on elections that Europeans themselves care so little about. Turnout in the European Parliament vote is markedly lower than in national ones; few will follow the work of the 720 elected members who will take their seats in July. But the election will nonetheless have two serious political consequences. One of them will be to determine whether Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, the bloc’s powerful executive arm, will get another five-year term. The other concerns national politicians, some of whom will end up with electoral bloody noses come June 10th, as their parties get trounced. Both developments have the potential to gridlock European politics.

The immediate focus will be on what happens in Brussels. Eight days after the elections, the EU’s leaders will hold a summit to decide who will lead the bloc’s institutions, notably the commission. Mrs von der Leyen has helped to shape some of the continent’s major policies. Her steadfast support of Ukraine has proved vital. It was the commission that pushed Europe to aim for net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. Mrs von der Leyen has set the tone for the continent’s relationship with China: “derisking” its supply chains from its imports, but not “decoupling” from it as America sometimes seems inclined to.

Yet her future is not assured. To get a second term, Mrs von der Leyen will need to be nominated by EU leaders, then approved by a majority of new MEPs. As the “lead candidate” for the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP), which is ahead in the polls, she is the front-runner. Yet the bloc’s treaties stipulate only that leaders must take the results of the elections into account when appointing a commission boss. Being favourite for a top Euro-job has meant little in the past.

Stuck in the mire with EU

Most of the EU’s national leaders like Mrs von der Leyen, a former German defence minister whose earnestness includes having set up her living quarters in a glorified closet in the commission’s headquarters in Brussels. But each president, chancellor or prime minister has priorities which may clash with their neighbours’. Every country wants a big portfolio in the commission, whether overseeing trade rules, enlargement or its economy. The machinations of European leaders are rarely predictable, but odds are the incumbent will be put forward for a second term, in one of two planned summits in June. (As well as a new head of the commission, a new foreign-policy chief and a new president of the European Council to chair meetings of EU leaders will also be needed.)

Few expect such a smooth ride in the European Parliament, at least half of whom must back the EU leaders’ nominee. To secure her first mandate five years ago, a coalition of Liberals, Socialists and her own EPP was enough. But this centrist faction has since lost ground to populists (see chart), who are formed into two main groups, Identity and Democracy (ID), and the more moderate European Conservatives and Reformists. Once an opposition force, the hard right now includes national leaders like Giorgia Meloni in Italy. In several other big countries, including France, Poland and perhaps Germany, polls indicate populist parties will come first or second in the EU vote (see map). Forming coalitions without them is becoming harder.

The 400 or so seats the centrist trio of parties are expected to win may not be enough to secure the 361 votes Mrs von der Leyen needs for a majority. That is because the ballot, which could happen in either July or September, is secret and MEPs have ditched their groups in previous confirmation votes. As Europe shifts to the right, a coalition bringing in more left-leaning parties (such as the Greens) seems unlikely.

It is this conundrum that has prompted Mrs von der Leyen to moot an alliance with Ms Meloni’s party—part of the softer ECR group within the constellation of the hard right. But both liberals and socialists say they are reticent to join such an alliance. Tensions in the more hard-line ID group, which on May 23rd kicked out the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party after a scandal there, means a reshuffle of the EU-level alliances is on the cards.

The political contortions needed to get to a majority will only be clear once the votes are counted. As when forming national coalitions, both EU leaders and MEPs will be trying to ensure their agenda is heeded. If that happens, it could be several more months before the policies are fleshed out to everyone’s satisfaction. The Dutch held elections in November and only this week got a new prime minister. The fear in Brussels is that a similar delay could occur. If all political parties stick to their red lines, it may mean no coalition is available to back any candidate for the EU’s top executive job. What then? In contrast to the national level, fresh elections cannot be called to break a deadlock.

Should that happen, the current team of European commissioners would remain in office but lack the political legitimacy to get anything done. If these were quiet times, having Europe indulge in a bout of political navel-gazing would be no grave matter. But these times are not quiet.

With war still raging in Ukraine, Europe’s economy falling behind its global rivals and the need to finance the green transition, many countries including France are keen to recast the EU budget. Poland and Greece have suggested a pricey missile-defence shield for Europe that could be funded by cash jointly borrowed through the union, as happened with the pandemic recovery fund. Germany and the Netherlands, whose incoming coalition includes the hard right, are less keen. Other brewing feuds include the need to reform the EU’s rules to let in new members including Ukraine, and a mounting trade row with China over electric cars.

Such disputes are hard enough to mediate among Europeans with a fully functional commission in Brussels. Without it they may prove overwhelming. Worse, rudderlessness in Brussels would be compounded by the same in several member states. In France, Emmanuel Macron’s party may finish a distant second to the National Rally, or even fall to third place. That would boost the opposition in France’s parliament, where the minority government has at times scraped through in important votes. A figurehead for EU integration, Mr Macron will be weakened at home and thus in Europe.

Much the same will be true in Germany. The AfD may now fall short of once sky-high expectations, but could still edge the Social Democrats of Olaf Scholz, the chancellor, into third place. The expected poor showing by the liberal Free Democrats could upset the fragile balance that now reigns in German politics. Soon enough all eyes will turn to national elections in 2025, making it even harder for politicians in Berlin to agree to grand EU initiatives of the sort Mr Macron regularly calls for.

Messrs Macron and Scholz put on a show of European unity this week as the French president descended on Germany for a state visit. Though the vital Franco-German relationship remains frosty, the pair went to great lengths to highlight where they agreed. Their time is limited to get much done. And several months of it will be spent on working out who ought to run Europe and how. ■

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