Israel’s invasion of Lebanon may bolster support for Hizbullah
THE BRIGHT yellow flags of Hizbullah that line the highway leading south out of Saida, a port city in southern Lebanon, seem like the standards of a floundering kingdom. Head farther south, where Hizbullah, the Shia militia, holds sway, and the streets grow ever emptier. The only fighters visible are the dead ones staring down from posters. The decapitation, almost overnight, of the Hizbullah’s military leadership, and the assassination of its charismatic leader, Hassan Nassrallah, have shocked everyone, not least the Shia group’s own supporters.
Over a week after more than 80 Israeli bombs obliterated Nasrallah’s headquarters in southern Beirut, the group has yet to hold a funeral (reports suggest that he was secretly buried at a temporary site). Nor has it named a replacement; the surviving leadership is in disarray. The group’s military response to Israel’s aerial onslaught so far has been underwhelming.
As a fighting force Hizbullah has been bloodied. The obvious damage to its military strength is prompting questions about its ability to defend the Lebanese and its legitimacy as a political actor in Lebanon. But the group’s domination of Lebanon is based on far more than its military strength. It has spent decades embedding itself within Lebanon’s sectarian system, while simultaneously building a parallel state, neither of which will be destroyed by Israel’s current campaign.
In the early years of Hizbullah, its stated aim was to declare a Shia Islamic state in Lebanon, like that of Iran. It soon abandoned that goal, however. Instead it elected to play the Lebanese political system, like the country’s many other parties. But Hizbullah was arguably better at it than the rest. The group has the legitimacy of a state without the accountability, writes Lina Khatib of Chatham House, a think-tank in London.
Hizbullah cemented its influence by winning seats in parliament, inserting its supporters into key positions in ministries, fostering pacts with the country’s corrupt elites and extracting vast sums of money from the trade in captagon, an amphetamine mainly produced in Syria. Shia recruits were given the answers for exams which propelled them into sensitive roles in the military. Hizbullah’s people dominated elections to local councils which had an important role in overseeing the distribution of international development funds. When the group’s demands were not met, it turned to violence and intimidation. It is believed to be behind the assassination of the former prime minister, Rafik Hariri, in 2005, who had called on Syria to take its troops out of Lebanon (Syria was, at the time, a key patron of Hizbullah).
At the same time, it built a parallel social-welfare system, using money from Iran and from the group’s drug trade in Syria. A party membership card was more useful than a social-security number in gaining access to the best doctors. Scholarships sponsored by Hizbullah made education at Lebanon’s American universities affordable for bright children from impoverished Shia communities. Grants provided startup funds to Shia businesses.
Support for Hizbullah was based on more than the benefits it provided, however. The group’s armed resistance to Israel found particular salience among Lebanon’s Shias, long regarded as the country’s underclass. It claimed its first major victory in 2000 when Israel withdrew its troops after facing almost two decades of guerilla warfare. In the 34-day war in 2006 Hizbullah was battered but survived. That, said Nasrallah, was a victory in itself. Many saw in Hizbullah a force in Lebanon at last strong enough to stand up to Israel.
Its growing clout also came from the lead it took in reconstruction throughout much of the south after the 2006 war. Almost everything was rebuilt within five years. Because it wielded so much power in local government, Hizbullah was able to channel huge sums of money from foreign donors into rebuilding its communities. “We knew it was all going through Hizbullah, but we did it anyway. If we hadn’t the south would never have been rebuilt,” said one Gulf diplomat who was involved in the efforts. The world paid while Hizbullah took the credit, a victory on top of a victory for Nasrallah’s cadres.
The group established an effective social contract with many of the country’s Shia: absolute loyalty to Hizbullah in exchange for security and stability. Over the years, opposition from within the Shia community has been minimal, and even Hizbullah’s doubters often stop short of criticising its resistance to Israel. In part, that was because Hizbullah offered Shias, long marginalised within Lebanon, a different vision of themselves. “They wanted to transform the victimhood into a steadfast and proud community,” says Mona Harb, a professor of politics at the American University of Beirut.
And yet over the past month, Hizbullah has been unable to protect Lebanon or its Shia constituents. Of the 1.2m that have been displaced, many come from areas where sympathy for Hizbullah is strong. Lebanon’s weak government and its other political parties are taking care of those who have been affected by the war, not the Party of God.
But Israel’s ground invasion has offered the movement a lifeline. In fighting Israeli troops, it can reclaim the mantle of resistance. The need for post-war reconstruction will present new opportunities to regain its legitimacy. “Don’t underestimate Hizbullah’s ability to claim victory; if the war is over and they can lift the flag, that is enough,” says Ali al-Amine, a Lebanese journalist. The beginning of this was a disaster for Hizbullah. Its escalation may offer a reprieve. ■
Sign up to the Middle East Dispatch, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop on a fascinating, complex and consequential part of the world.