Merz wins a messy election then calls for independence from America
Editor’s note (February 24th): This story has been updated.
As COUNTING ended in Germany’s election, three things were clear. The first is that the opposition conservative Christian Democrats (CDU), along with their Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), had won a clear victory—if an underwhelming one, with 29% of the vote. That paves the way for their candidate, Friedrich Merz (pictured), to take over from Olaf Scholz as chancellor after coalition talks. The second is that the hard-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) had surged to its best-ever result, with 21%, a result that will roughly double its number of seats in the Bundestag. The party dominated in its eastern strongholds. Alice Weidel, the party’s co-leader, hailed the “historic success”. The third is the extraordinary turnout. Some 83% of eligible Germans cast a ballot, the highest figure since reunification 35 years ago.
Beyond that, it got more messy. Mr Merz will hope to form a coalition with Mr Scholz’s Social Democrats (SPD), who at 16% slumped to their worst defeat in the party’s long history. But under Germany’s electoral rules, whether the main centre-left and centre-right parties would be able to form what used to be known as a “grand” coalition depended entirely on whether the new “left-conservative” Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) could reach the 5% threshold needed to gain parliamentary representation. It fell agonisingly short—by three-one-hundredths of a percentage point. That means the CDU/CSU and SPD will have a majority, albeit probably of just 13 seats, and will not need to team up with the Greens—who will now enter the parliamentary opposition. That ideologically messy three-party government is exactly what Mr Merz, who wants to act decisively to restore German voters’ faith in politics, wanted to avoid.
Even building a coalition with the SPD alone will not be at all easy. After what by German standards was a rough campaign, many fear it will prove difficult to build the necessary trust and find the compromises German coalition deals require. One SPD MP recently said the prospect of a grand coalition made her “feel like gagging”. Mr Merz did not help his case by spending election eve ranting at “green and left-wing idiots” who he suggested were not in possession of a full quotient of marbles. A bigger challenge will be his willingness to compromise on his proposals to manage irregular immigration to Germany. Mr Merz has said his demands for permanent controls at Germany’s borders and the rejection of asylum-seekers are non-negotiable. But both the SPD and Greens say they contravene domestic and European law.
The would-be governing parties will also need to find agreement on loosening Germany’s constitutional debt brake, which makes it impossible for the federal government to run more than tiny deficits. Germany’s investment needs run into the hundreds of billions, covering everything from repairing its crumbling public infrastructure to boosting its defence spending. Merely to meet NATO’s (increasingly insufficient) target of 2% of GDP, the country will need to find at least another €30bn ($31bn) a year from 2028 once a special fund runs out. The budget cuts proposed by Mr Merz cannot hope to meet these needs. That is why he has signalled openness to relaxing the debt brake, fealty to which has long been an article of faith among his party troops.
Yet constitutional changes require two-thirds majorities in parliament. To amend the rule the governing parties will need support from the Greens as well as Die Linke, a hard-left party that enjoyed an extraordinary last-minute surge, especially among young voters, to win 9% of the vote. As a “pro-peace” party, its support, if forthcoming, will surely carry a high price. That in turn could antagonise hardline MPs in Mr Merz’s ranks who detest leftists and are sceptical about easing the debt brake in the first place.
As this suggests, the election’s outcome will hardly please those who had hoped desperately for political clarity in a country that has long been lacking it. The CDU/CSU’s victory is largely a function of the outgoing government’s unpopularity: it once hoped to win over 35% of the vote, but in the end scored its second-worst result ever. That may revive old doubts inside the party over Mr Merz, who had upset many Germans by accepting AfD votes to push through anti-immigration motions through the Bundestag last month. His personal ratings are low.
Meanwhile the SPD’s disastrous performance will inspire a period of insular soul-searching and a clear-out of personnel: Mr Scholz, for one, will soon be history. (Lars Klingbeil, the party’s co-leader, is now the figure to watch; he will now shift to leading the party’s parliamentary group.) “It’s a bitter result, and it hurts,” Alexander Schweitzer, the SPD minister-president of the state of Rhineland-Palatinate, told The Economist. The only parties unambiguously celebrating are two fringe outfits with no hope of entering government: the AfD and Die Linke.
Ordinarily, a result like this would inspire a bout of navel-gazing among Germany’s main parties before they settled into coalition talks. But this time is different. Donald Trump has upended the diplomacy around Ukraine, forcing Europe into a panicked hive of activity. One minute after polls closed in Germany António Costa, the president of the European Council, called a special EU summit for March 6th to discuss Ukraine and European security. As Germany’s chancellor until his successor is elected by the Bundestag, Mr Scholz will attend that meeting. But he will need to consult closely with the man who will replace him.
For his part, Mr Merz appears to understand that the tectonic shifts in geopolitics under Mr Trump will not afford him the luxury of time. Speaking soon after his victory he mused about the possibility of an “independent European defence capability” to replace NATO, and said it was “an absolute priority to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible, so that we achieve independence from the US”. Before the election he had raised the prospect of nuclear co-operation with France or Britain to replace the American umbrella; informal talks with the French have already taken place. These are extraordinary statements from a man steeped in the CDU’s transatlanticism. But these are extraordinary times. ■