Iran and Israel’s shadow war explodes into the open
IT WAS THE opposite of “shock and awe”, a slow-moving drama that unfolded for hours before it culminated. First came grainy videos from remote bits of Iraq, the buzzing whine in the night sky a telltale sign that Iran had launched a fleet of drones. After midnight residents of Amman, the Jordanian capital, looked up to see flashes of light and a rain of debris. Then, shortly before 2am, came the air-raid sirens and the boom of interceptors in Israel, and a striking scene of missiles flying over the resplendent Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem.
On April 13th Iran launched hundreds of drones and missiles at Israel. This was retaliation for an Israeli air strike on April 1st that killed seven Iranian officers, including a top general, at the country’s embassy in Damascus. It was at once dramatic and anticlimactic. Now Israel must decide how to respond. If Iran is able to strike other countries directly with impunity it could change the rules of the Middle East: until now it has often relied on deniable proxies. But it is far from clear Israel can retaliate effectively without risking all-out war and angering America and other allies.
After decades of fighting Israel through proxies, this was the first time Iran struck at Israel from its own soil—a “shadow war” no longer. Yet the strike was, militarily, a flop. All but a few of the missiles and drones were intercepted, some before they even reached Israel. The Israeli ambulance service reported just one direct injury, a seven-year-old Bedouin girl who was hurt by falling shrapnel in the country’s south. Damage was minimal: Iran did score a direct hit on an Israeli air base in the Negev desert, but the base remains operational. Before daybreak Israelis were told they could leave their bomb shelters. Soon after the country’s airspace was reopened.
For two weeks Iran deliberated how to retaliate for the Israeli strike in Damascus. Its leaders had hoped to find a Goldilocks option that would placate their domestic audience and deter Israel without triggering an even bigger Israeli reprisal. What they settled on, though, may prove to be a strategic blunder that harms their interests.
Iran has been a beneficiary of Israel’s six-month war in Gaza until now. Its proxy militias have made an impressive show of force across the region: Hizbullah in Lebanon has displaced perhaps 80,000 Israelis from cities and towns in the north through near-daily rocket fire, while the Houthis in Yemen have disrupted global trade by attacking ships in the Red Sea. At the same time, Iran had managed to maintain its detente with Arab states, which were keen to avoid conflict. Meanwhile, its enemies seemed to be losing. Israel was stuck in a quagmire in Gaza and increasingly isolated, while America looked feckless.
The Iranian strike on Israel may have squandered those gains in three ways. First is the blow to its deterrence. Iran did not want to cause mass casualties in Israel. If it had, it would not have telegraphed the attack for days, nor started with slow-moving drones that took hours to reach their targets. But it also declined to settle for symbolic retaliation: firing around 350 missiles and drones at another country is no mere gesture. That it did so while causing only one injury and minimal damage makes it look weak.
Second, it brought Western and Arab states together in support of Israel. America and Britain set aside their growing animosity for Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, and used their fighter jets and missile-defence systems to help take out Iranian drones before they reached Israel (France may have assisted the operation, too). Jordan shot down dozens of projectiles. Sensitive to public opinion, its government may frame this as protecting Jordan’s airspace rather than defending Israel—but it was a defence nonetheless. Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, might have played an indirect role as well, since they host Western air-defence systems, surveillance and refuelling aircraft that would have been vital for the effort.
Third, for all its paeans to the Palestinian cause, Iran has now pushed Gaza down the global agenda. A week ago much of the world was united in outrage over the appalling civilian death toll and worsening hunger caused by Israel’s invasion of Gaza, which followed Hamas’s atrocities on October 7th. Even some of Israel’s closest allies were talking about imposing restrictions on arms sales. The conversation looks very different today. Israel can portray itself as a victim (even though it was an Israeli air strike that precipitated the Iranian barrage). Talk of restricting arms sales will be set aside. The plight of Gazans will be secondary to the prospect of a bigger regional war.
There are caveats. In some parts of the Arab world, the attack may give Iran’s image a fillip: it is the first state to strike Israel since Saddam Hussein targeted it with Scud missiles during the Gulf war in 1991. But residents of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria spent the night worrying that debris from intercepted drones would fall on their heads—not the sort of thing that will endear Iran to them. For many, it was a reminder that Arabs are too often collateral damage in the conflict between Israel and Iran.
The outcome puts Israel in a bind. If the Iranian attack had been deadlier, it would have made a reprisal inevitable; if it had been smaller, Israel could have shrugged it off. The precedent set is not entirely reassuring. While Israel’s air defences performed well, they had weeks to prepare and help from at least three other countries. They may be put under greater pressure under less favourable circumstances. On April 14th Iran appeared to suggest a new strategic doctrine, of acting directly rather than through proxies. “From now on, if the Zionist regime attacks our interests, assets, people or citizens at any point we will counter attack from the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Hossein Salami, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, told Iranian TV. It is doubtful that Iran could make such barrages a regular event but the intent is alarming.
As the attack unfolded, Israel sent mixed messages about how it might retaliate. An unnamed senior official told Israel’s Channel 12 that an “unprecedented response” was coming and that Israelis should stay awake through the night to watch it (they would have been disappointed: nothing happened). Other sources were less brash, saying that the response would depend on the extent of the damage. Israel has no easy options. It could retaliate in kind, launching its own drones and missiles against army bases or nuclear sites in Iran. But that carries a real risk that Iran will strike back a second time, and harder. It would also alarm Israel’s allies who are no friends of Iran but fear a regional war. Joe Biden has signalled that America will not assist an Israeli counter-attack on Iran. He has called a meeting of G7 leaders, apparently to coordinate a diplomatic response.
There are other possibilities. Israel could attack Iranian targets elsewhere in the region, which would signal that it is not deterred but would be less likely to cause further escalation. Or it could do nothing for now, recalling Napoleon’s adage: “Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.” Whatever it wants to do, Israel would be wise to consult with allies, none of whom wants to see uncontrolled escalation. A sensible Israeli government would recognise that it owes a debt to America, Britain and several Arab states for their role in its defence. These relationships, rather than isolation, enhance Israel’s security.
Whether Israel’s present government is capable of making sensitive judgements about retaliation is an open question. On April 14th the war cabinet was due to meet during the afternoon. Since October 7th Mr Netanyahu’s administration has made one strategic mistake after another: it missed the warning signs before Hamas’s attack and blundered into a war that has become a moral and strategic failure. Then it bombed Iran’s embassy compound on the mistaken assessment that such a provocation would not trigger a direct Iranian response. Almost no one, in Israel or abroad, trusts Mr Netanyahu to navigate a far more complicated regional conflict.
Iran has erred in its response to the Damascus strike. Its mass drone and missile attacks have done little damage while triggering renewed sympathy for Israel and crossing a rubicon that has already drawn widespread condemnation. Yet it is far from clear that Israel’s dysfunctional government can capitalise on Iran’s mistake by showing restraint, keeping allies on board, and avoiding a full blown war that would have dire consequences for the world economy and tens of millions of people.■
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