How to Trump-proof America’s alliances
Nato’s leaders gather in Washington on July 9th-11th to celebrate “the greatest military alliance in the history of the world”, as President Joe Biden calls it. He is right. NATO has helped keep the peace in Europe for 75 years, a stunning achievement after the continent’s centuries of war. Its “Article 5” guarantee—that an attack on one member is an attack on all—has deterred first the Soviet Union and then Russia. NATO has also been a forum for resolving tensions between its members. Small wonder nervous nations clamour to become part of it. Membership has risen from 12 in 1949 to 32 now, with Sweden joining in April and Finland last year.
Yet, although NATO has much to celebrate, this will not be a happy anniversary. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine grinds on. China continues to support Russian industry. Iran and North Korea are supplying Vladimir Putin with drones, ballistic missiles and artillery shells. The autocratic governments of these four countries are growing ever closer, a challenge to the world order that NATO has done so much to underpin.
An even graver worry is internal. nato’s leaders may soon include Donald Trump, who is odds-on to win America’s election in November, and Marine Le Pen, the soft-on-Russia populist French leader who may take the Elysée in 2027. Western democracies must act fast to confront these dangers.
They should start by recognising that America’s 60-odd alliances are a huge geopolitical asset—not a burden, as Mr Trump often seems to think. Allies amplify American power. In contrast, China and Russia have no equivalent, only clients or partners of convenience. America should refresh its alliances, as Mr Biden has started to do. nato has grown wider and stronger. Alliances in Asia are being beefed up, too. And the two groups have begun to work more closely together.
The threats in Europe and Asia are increasingly linked, so it makes sense for allies in both regions to act in concert, economically and politically as well as militarily. The g7, a forum of democracies with large economies, should admit more Asian allies, such as South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. Direct military co-operation will have to be more limited, not least because the distances are so vast. But eastern and western allies should conduct more joint exercises and freedom-of-navigation patrols in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Wooing India will be essential. It has moved closer to the West but clings to a long-standing partnership with Russia and an old ideology of non-alignment. The sooner it begins to calculate that its interests lie with the rules-based camp, the better.
As for nato itself, Mr Trump is right about one thing. Its members should meet their stated target of spending 2% of GDP on defence. Then they should raise it to 2.5%. Progress towards the 2% goal has been fairly good since Mr Putin invaded Ukraine, but apart from America itself and front-line states such as Poland and the Baltic states, few members are close to 2.5%.
Those that fail to make the 2% grade should lose some privileges, such as the chance for their candidates to take big jobs. But no member should be denied the protection of Article 5, and this is where Mr Trump is especially dangerous. While all eyes were on Mr Biden’s stumbling performance at their recent debate, Mr Trump repeated his threat not to defend nato allies against Russia “if you don’t pay”. Casting doubt on Article 5 destroys trust among America’s allies and encourages its enemies to test the alliance’s solidarity, quite possibly leading to dangerous miscalculations. As doubt spreads, the effects will be felt globally. Countries that suspect they cannot rely absolutely on America may rush to acquire nuclear weapons, setting off arms races from East Asia to the Gulf.
The most immediate test for NATO is to help Ukraine defend itself. Mr Putin is prepared to waste Russian blood and treasure for many years trying to conquer his neighbour. Stopping him will require more Western arms and aid. But the only way Ukraine can be truly safe is within nato. Summiteers in Washington should pledge to let it in soon, thus making clear to Mr Putin that he cannot block Ukrainian membership by prolonging the war. Article 5 would not necessarily require troops from other NATO countries to fight on Ukrainian soil; its commitments could be met with generous supplies of weapons, plus help with logistics and battlefield intelligence.
Admitting Ukraine to NATO in wartime poses risks, but so would a long war of attrition or a Ukrainian collapse. The best way to ensure that NATO is still around to celebrate its 80th birthday is to win in Ukraine. ■