Russia is no longer simply attacking Ukraine’s grid; it is field-testing a strategy of blackout warfare. As it unleashes thousands of drones and hundreds of missiles per month across Ukraine, Moscow now combines strikes on power plants and hard-to-replace high-voltage transformers as well as and destruction of natural gas systems all the way down to the city level. The impacts are stark: families shivering in the dark, schools interrupted, hospitals trying to deliver lifesaving care with generator power and limited water, and industry starving for electrons.
This campaign is creating a blueprint for how modern great powers will try to cripple one another in future conflicts. Allied countries must therefore treat assisting Ukraine’s grid defense not as charity, but as an investment in their own future electricity security, which underpins so many critical dimensions of modern life. Backroom deals will not end this war, but learning how to better defend Ukraine’s electricity will set the foundation for a durable future peace.
Russia’s destruction will not be constrained to Ukraine. A triumphant Moscow would likely apply similar tactics in NATO countries. China is also learning from the Russian experience and is likely to employ blackout warfare against Taiwan, if Beijing chooses to pursue coercive annexation—a course of action that Chinese President Xi Jinping has consistently threatened.
Russian forces carried out at least 25 massive attacks against Ukraine’s electrical infrastructure between September 2022 and September 2024, pushing the system hard. But the attack waves this fall have been different in four fundamental ways.
Firstly, sheer volume is overwhelming Ukrainian air defenders. Data from the Ukrainian Air Force shows that to date, Russia has fired more than 62,000 long-range drones and 9,300 heavy strike missiles at Ukraine. Russia’s production investments and an endless river of Chinese-supplied components enable it to now fire dozens of missiles and as many as 800 drones and decoys in a single night to terrorize Ukrainians.
A dangerous new precision is also threatening key Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Some newer Shahed (also called Geran) one-way strike drones can even strike moving trains. This means that power plants and substations are now much more vulnerable—and that even a few drones leaking through air defenses can cause pinpoint destruction.
Meanwhile, interceptor missile supplies to Ukrainian air defenders are not keeping pace with the volume and evolving tactics of Russian missile forces. Ukraine has many options to intercept drones, but only another missile can stop a ballistic missile plunging toward a power plant or substation at supersonic speeds.
But most of all, Russia’s assault is unrelenting—and offers little chance for Ukraine to rebuild. Russia is truly attacking all of the energy system at high intensity: Most large thermal power plants are destroyed; large substations (including for nuclear plants) are repeatedly targeted; and now, the natural gas system is also under sustained assault.
As a result of Russia’s assault, this winter will likely be the hardest yet for millions of Ukrainian civilians. Burned power plants, cratered substations, and blasted natural gas compressor stations mean no lights, no heat, and no water for millions. With daytime highs dropping to freezing temperatures by New Year’s across most of Ukraine, the potential for a humanitarian crisis and refugee flows into Europe is substantial.
Indeed, this is likely one of Russia’s key goals. Since the full-scale invasion began nearly four years ago, Moscow has realized that while it cannot win on the battlefield, it can terrorize Ukrainian society instead, hoping to force collapse or concessions.
So what can Ukraine do in response—and how can its partners help? Here are three actionable ideas to start, arranged in order of what could most rapidly address the most acute humanitarian needs.
First, use frozen Russian assets to keep Ukrainians alive. It’s time for the world’s largest purchase of personal generators as well as more grid-scale batteries and solar panels to charge them. A decent generator now costs about $1,000 in Ukraine, according to popular Ukrainian e-commerce site Rozetka. Each addition of a billion dollars could thus source a million portable generators. That number could help 5 million to 6 million people survive the winter. Batteries, meanwhile, are bridge assets that can help stabilize the power system when thermal plants are struck.
Allies of Ukraine could use that same pool of Russian money to further capitalize the global gas turbine and transformer industrial base. Ukrainian utilities can be given access to a large, globalized industrial base to replace losses. Russian strike forces are partly powered by China’s industrial base. In response, Ukrainian power companies need access to a larger global industrial base for their equipment. Providing that would send a deterrent message to Russia.
Second, create a wider program of energy deterrence. Ukraine’s DeepStrike program—its retaliatory effort to send strikes deep into Russian territory—makes it increasingly clear to Russian officials that further strikes on Ukraine’s energy system will not be free of costs. One of the authors has already tallied up more than 200 confirmed and suspected Ukrainian kinetic strikes on Russian oil, gas, and electricity infrastructure since early 2022, with a dramatic intensification since late summer of this year. The more credibly that Ukraine can prosecute an “eye for an eye” form of energy infrastructure deterrence posture, the better that it will be able to deter Moscow in the future.
Accordingly, NATO partners should prioritize delivering air defense missiles to Ukraine, including by placing Kyiv at the front of the queue for the urgently needed additional Patriot and SAMP/T missile systems. Second, the West should also equip Kyiv with long-range strike capabilities, such as JASSM and Taurus missiles, as well as any other long-range systems needed to complement Kyiv’s already-successful campaign to degrade Russia’s oil refining and export capabilities.
The United States and its partners should also provide more support to Ukraine’s DeepStrike program, so that it can achieve and sustain a rate of monthly long-range drone and heavy strike missile fire equal to Russia’s. This would mean ensuring that Ukraine could produce and launch more than 200 missiles and more than 4,500 long-range drones in a given 30-day period
Third, and finally, create a long-term nuclear partnership . Washington should also work with Kyiv to get several new AP1000 nuclear reactors built in western Ukraine. While this will not solve the electricity crisis of 2025, signing deals now and forging steel by 2027 would signal to Moscow that the West is committed to Ukraine’s energy security for decades. Fighter jets create a 25 year partnership, but nuclear reactors can anchor one for 60 years or more, making nuclear energy an essential component of great–power competition.
Russia is failing on the battlefield. In nearly four years of heavy fighting, it has only gained control of an area slightly larger than the U.S. state of West Virginia. At this rate, seizing the rest of the Donbas region that Russian President Vladimir Putin is so obsessed with could take several more years. According to Ukrainian estimates, Russia has sacrificed more than 1 million soldiers, including both killed in action and wounded troops, and it currently sustains about 1,000 additional casualties per day.
For comparison, more than 416,000 U.S. soldiers were killed in World War II, the bloodiest conflict that the world has ever known. Because Putin cannot break Ukraine’s army on the field, he is trying to break the society at home using blackout warfare.
Ukrainians do not want to be ruled again by the Russian Empire. As 19th century Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko said: “Fight—and you will win!”
Helping Ukraine win the war for electricity is a critical battle—lasting peace requires victory on the grid front. Allied countries can provide this help at manageable cost and in ways that also directly facilitate enhancing their electricity resilience and security in a renewed era of great-power conflict.