More political loyalists will not fix the civil service. This will.

Mike Hayden was director of the CIA from 2006 to 2009 and of the National Security Agency from 1999 to 2005. James Loy was deputy secretary of Homeland Security from 2003 to 2005 and commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard from 1998 to 2002. J. Michael “Mike” McConnell was director of national intelligence from 2007 to 2009 and of the NSA from 1992 to 1996. John Negroponte was deputy secretary of state from 2007 to 2009 and director of national intelligence from 2005 to 2007. Sean O’Keefe was NASA administrator from 2001 to 2005 and secretary of the Navy from 1992 to 1993.

Frustrated by what he saw as an entrenched bureaucracy resistant to his policies, Donald Trump as president attempted to remove most of the protections afforded federal civil servants so he could replace them with policy proponents and loyalists. Although his efforts were promptly rescinded by newly elected President Biden, Trump has announced that he would try again if reelected.

We think there is some merit in both points of view. However, as members of a bipartisan group of former national and homeland security, diplomatic, intelligence and law enforcement officials who have served both Democratic and Republican presidents, we think there is a “third way” that preserves all that is right with our civil service but also addresses what almost everyone agrees is wrong with it.

Our experience has shown us that career civil servants are a priceless resource who must be preserved and protected from partisan political influence. Their ability to “speak truth to power” (including to officials like us) without fear of losing their jobs was and is critical — so using political ideology as a litmus test in their appointment or retention, no matter how well-intentioned that might be, presents a dangerous risk to our national security.

However, these employees must also be held accountable for doing their jobs well. As a practical matter, the few bad actors among them are overprotected under the existing system. It is just too hard to ensure that they can be terminated when they fail to meet reasonable standards of performance or conduct — for example, for refusing a direct, lawful order.

Thus, we think the current civil service system is badly in need of reform. But the blueprints offered by both left and right are problematic. One side is firmly rooted in a status quo that (inadvertently or otherwise) impedes accountability, and the other could end up politicizing the very civil servants who should be politically neutral.

We think effective reform can be accomplished without politicizing the system or those employed by it. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) recently issued a rule intended to make it harder to use criteria other than merit to hire or fire federal civil servants. We applaud the effort, but although that rule might delay that potential politicization, it does not prohibit a president — any president, of either party — from undoing it. And that is bad for our country.

This battle is far from over, and we believe that only Congress can provide a sound, lasting and effective balance between protections and accountability. Here is what we propose:

1. Congress must revise civil service laws so adverse actions for misconduct or poor performance can be taken and resolved quickly, simply and with finality. That is not the case today, and it can be done without compromising on basic due process. Civil servants should be hired and fired on the basis of merit alone.

2. Congress must simultaneously continue to protect deserving career civil servants — especially those in national security, diplomatic, intelligence and law enforcement positions — from partisan influence by enacting legislation (perhaps modeled on the aforementioned OPM rule) that would prevent their potential politicization now and under future administrations.

3. Congress must also ensure the right balance between apolitical administration by career civil servants and their control by appointees of a democratically elected administration. This could be done by requiring that the mix in each agency be reviewed by a nonpartisan body, perhaps patterned after the U.S. military’s Quadrennial Review Commissions.

As what might be the only “must pass” legislation we are likely to see this election year, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 2025 is a potential vehicle for congressional action. And, of course, we would be happy to help.

However, let us be clear. We believe our career civil servants are a vital national resource. They have always brought unrivaled technical expertise, institutional memory and the ability to navigate complex bureaucracies that we always found to be truly invaluable. Any proposal that allows political loyalty or apathy to creep into their ranks — even in the name of greater accountability — must be stopped.