Israel has these four options for attacking Iran
At least twice in the past, in 2010 and 2011, Israel’s generals have been ordered by the prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, to prepare for imminent strikes on Iran. In both cases the security chiefs questioned the legality of the order, given without the necessary cabinet authorisation. In neither instance did Israel go to war with the Islamic Republic.
Today Israel is once again on the verge of thumping Iran. This time Mr Netanyahu will have no problem getting approval from a cabinet which if anything is even more gung-ho than he is. Nor are the leaders of Israel’s armed forces as opposed to such action as before. And this time Israel believes the odds are in its favour.
Israel’s leaders reckon that the 181 ballistic missiles fired by Iran at Israel on October 1st leave them with little alternative but to hit back. What form the retaliation takes could have wide-ranging implications for the Middle East and beyond.
Four types of targets are being considered. Mr Netanyahu has long favoured bombing the sites where Iran enriches uranium and carries out research for its nuclear programme. But these are dispersed around the country (see map) in heavily fortified locations deep underground. Doing significant damage would require large numbers of bunker-busting missiles launched from dozens of aircraft operating at least 1,200km (750 miles) away from Israel. Israel’s air force is the most powerful in the region but it may be difficult for it to set back Iran’s nuclear programme by more than a few months.
A more vulnerable strategic target would be Iran’s main ports, specifically the oil terminals which provide most of Iran’s foreign-currency income. Israeli strategists believe that destroying them would deal a severe blow to Iran’s already shaky economy. This, they hope, might provoke further unrest within Iran. Some dream that it could even lead to the regime’s downfall.
A third choice would be to target the country’s leaders directly, just as Israel has attacked the leaders of Iran’s proxies and allies, Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. This would be tricky, as Iran’s most senior figures would almost certainly retreat to secret protected locations if an Israeli strike looked imminent. And the impact of such attacks is always uncertain. The question of who will replace Iran’s ageing supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, is already a subject of much deliberation there.
Israel’s most obvious military response would be a tit-for-tat strike on Iran’s missile bases. This option would arguably be the least likely to provoke yet another missile salvo from Iran. But Mr Netanyahu believes that Israel has a historic chance to reshape the region. And this time some of his generals, though not all, agree. They think that the fact that Israel has withstood two major salvoes of Iranian missiles (the first in April) with barely any casualties or serious damage proves that Israel can withstand whatever Iran throws at it.
Those in favour of hitting Iran’s nuclear programme and economic infrastructure also believe that Israel has a rare momentum behind it, having in the space of weeks decapitated the main leaders of Hizbullah, Iran’s most powerful client militia in the region, and having destroyed a large proportion of its missile arsenal, too. Those missiles were supplied to Hizbullah by Iran to act as a deterrent against Israel attacking the Islamic Republic. Much of that deterrent has gone up in smoke.
So why, more than a week after Iran’s missile attack, has Israel not yet struck back? Not everyone in Israel’s security circles is in a rush to change the Middle East. Several of the country’s generals are counselling caution. For a start, they believe that Israel cannot afford to launch a campaign of this magnitude without co-ordinating with its main ally, the United States. But President Joe Biden has publicly spoken out against an Israeli attack on Iran’s oil infrastructure, since that risks causing global energy prices to soar on the eve of America’s elections. So far the president has also been against an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Despite the support worth nearly $18bn that America has given Israel in the past year, and although American planes and warships played a big part in intercepting Iran’s missiles, Israel has yet to share its plans with its closest ally. Mr Netanyahu even vetoed a proposed trip by Yoav Gallant, the defence minister, to Washington to discuss the options. Meanwhile, in televised statements Mr Netanyahu has promised the Iranians they will be free of their regime “a lot sooner than people think” and has exhorted the Lebanese to “free your country from Hizbullah”.
On October 9th Mr Netanyahu spoke by phone with Mr Biden for almost an hour. They spent most of the call discussing the possible strikes but did not seem to reach any kind of agreement.
There are Israeli defence officials who worry that provoking an all-out war with Iran, while Israel is still fighting Hamas in Gaza and has launched a ground invasion against Hizbullah in southern Lebanon, would stretch resources dangerously thin. Some generals warn of squandering the gains already made.
But since the disaster of October 7th 2023, the credibility of Israel’s military and intelligence chiefs in standing up to the prime minister has diminished. Like Mr Netanyahu, they seem ready to risk a devastating conflagration in order to transform their legacy from having overseen Israel’s greatest debacle to becoming the victors of a regional war. Like him, they may yet fall victim to their own hubris. ■
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