New Zealand and the Cook Islands fall out over China
IN THE strategic contest under way in the Pacific, a familiar pattern has emerged. China signs an agreement with an island nation. America’s regional partners get spooked. The Cook Islands, a sparsely populated string of 15 islets, is the latest to set off alarm bells. Its prime minister, Mark Brown, was preparing to sign a “comprehensive strategic partnership” to “expand economic opportunities” with China as The Economist went to press. That has sparked a fight with New Zealand, the Cook Islands’ former colonist.
The Cook Islands needs trade and investment. Its economy depends on tourism, and, having graduated to “high-income” status in 2020, it is no longer eligible for aid. As Mr Brown sees it, China is part of the solution. Details of his deal have not yet been made public, but the agreement could set a path for Chinese engagement in deep-sea mining—which both China and Mr Brown are itching to develop, though many other Pacific nations oppose it. Mr Brown is so keen on digging up critical minerals that he dishes out nodules of them at conferences.
New Zealand complains about being “blindsided”. It has long been the Cook Islands’ biggest donor. Under a “free association” agreement, Cook Islanders hold New Zealand passports, and the two countries are required to collaborate on security and foreign policy. New Zealand’s conservative government claims that Mr Brown has flouted this arrangement by refusing to share details of his deal. This “lack of transparency” could “have major strategic and security implications”, wrote a spokesperson for Winston Peters, who is both foreign minister and deputy prime minister.
In reality, the arrangement between New Zealand and the Cook Islands sketches out only vague expectations about “co-operation” and “consultation”. Mr Brown argues that New Zealand had fair warning. He says he is not seeking security assistance from China—a matter of concern since China struck a security deal in the Solomon Islands in 2022, fuelling fears about a military base there. Still, an economic deal may have security implications, for instance by giving China access to strategic minerals, points out Anna Powles of Massey University in Wellington. Mr Brown did nothing to allay such concerns when he described China in an interview as a “like-minded country”. Many Cook Islanders are worried and on February 13th the opposition party filed a no-confidence motion against Mr Brown.
New Zealand’s dispute with the Cook Islands is its second in the Pacific this year. On January 27th Mr Peters announced that he would review all aid funding to Kiribati, Hawaii’s closest neighbour, after Taneti Maamau, the president, cancelled a meeting with him. Kiribati has cosied up to China in recent years and a policing agreement has stationed Chinese officers in Kiribati’s capital. Officials in New Zealand and Australia complain of trouble speaking with counterparts in Mr Maamau’s government. Together the countries account for almost half of Kiribati’s aid.
New Zealand is not likely to cut that funding, says Dr Powles. Mr Peters “knows that heavy-handed tactics do not go over well in the Pacific”. But for that reason, grandstanding may not serve its interests. Australia’s centre-left government, by contrast, has taken a softer approach to Pacific diplomacy. Its defence minister and deputy prime minister, Richard Marles, was also snubbed by Mr Maamau on a recent trip to Kiribati, but still delivered a patrol boat and praised their “close friendship” on social media. Such tactics work. Since 2023 Australia has signed agreements with Tuvalu and Nauru giving it veto rights over security partnerships with other countries (ie, China). In the grand competition, the tricky partners normally get more, not less, aid and attention. ■