Is Ukraine’s counter-offensive over?
THE UKRAINE WAR is at a stalemate. General Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s commander-in-chief, acknowledged so himself in a recent interview with The Economist. The long-awaited counter-offensive, which began in earnest on June 4th, has fizzled, with few territorial gains or losses on either side. Below are two charts and a map that help explain the latest developments.
Our first chart is from The Economist’s war tracker, which uses satellite data to monitor war-related activity. We track fires detected by FIRMS, a system originally set up by NASA to detect wildfires. Our machine-learning model then estimates which of these are caused by the conflict (from explosives, say). The system can be hindered by a range of factors, including weather conditions and incorrect labelling by our model. But over a long period it can systematically trace patterns in the fighting.
The model correctly picked up the operations in late May that laid the groundwork for the subsequent push in June. By mid-August nearly a thousand war-related fires were detected daily, as Ukrainian forces fought their way south towards Russia’s main defensive line in Zaporizhia oblast, eventually liberating Robotyne on August 28th. Since October 13th, however, we have detected fewer than 300 strikes on days with relatively clear skies, suggesting a slowdown.

Our second chart shows how much territory has changed hands. Using regularly updated maps from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), a think-tank, we can calculate how much of Ukraine has been taken or lost by Russia since the start of the war in 2022. ISW’s maps use open sources, such as footage and satellite imagery to assess areas of control. The data show the massive gains by Russia in the early days of fighting, followed by significant losses as Ukraine mounted its impressive defence. During Ukraine’s counter-offensive last autumn Russia lost 13% of the land it occupied. By comparison, the counter-offensive this year has led to almost no lasting gains by Ukraine since June 4th.
Our map shows where the current fighting is taking place. The axis in the south includes Robotyne and a push towards the city of Tokmak, which one Ukrainian general described as the “minimum goal” for the offensive. Ukrainian officials say that because they are conducting small-unit attacks on foot, rather than large armoured thrusts, they can keep attacking even as winter softens up the ground. But ammunition remains a constraint, and the reduction in fires suggests that shells may be becoming scarce just as North Korean shells begin flowing to Russia at scale.
Another area of heavy fighting is in Avdiivka, near Donetsk city, where Russian forces are trying—and failing—to take a heavily fortified town that they surround on three sides. A third area of fighting is to the east of Kherson city, where Ukrainian forces in recent weeks have managed to establish and hold a beach-head on the south side of the Dnieper—a tactical victory that has enabled them to funnel heavy equipment across the river.
To the Ukrainians’ credit, in moving slowly they have probably avoided the enormous losses suffered by Russian forces. Ukrainians have shown that, with support from the West, they can put up a tough fight. That fight continues: our data suggest that the counter-offensive’s big push is over, not that the war is. Ukraine’s partners should plan for a long fight.■