Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Southeast Asia Brief.
The highlights this week: Southeast Asian countries voice concern over U.S. adventurism in Venezuela, the Malaysian prime minister promises restive voters reform, and Vietnam and Indonesia are turning to the police and military for development goals.
Southeast Asia Worried by Maduro Seizure
The U.S. operation to snatch President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, from Venezuela over the weekend has been greeted with near-universal dismay in Southeast Asia, including by U.S. allies.
Countries in the region have long emphasized noninterference in one another’s sovereign affairs and international law as key elements of regional peace. But as with elsewhere in the world, the specter of U.S. power, and President Donald Trump’s mercurial nature, may have muted some of the responses.
Malaysia, as on the issue of Palestine, has been the most outspoken critic of the United States. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim called for the prompt release of Maduro and his wife.
Ibrahim said in a social media post on Sunday: “Whatever may be the reasons, the forcible removal of a sitting head of government through external action sets a dangerous precedent. It erodes fundamental restraints on the use of power between states and weakens the legal framework that underpins international order.”
Statements by Singapore and Indonesia on Sunday were only marginally more restrained. Singapore declared itself “gravely concerned” by the U.S. operation.
It went on to emphasize its commitment to international law as a safeguard to the sovereignty of countries, “especially small states.” The government of the island city-state has long cultivated an acute sense of its vulnerability as a small nation.
Indonesia also expressed “grave concern” over actions that “risk setting a dangerous precedent in international relations.”
The country has a rich seam of fear about foreign interference running through its political culture, with President Prabowo Subianto often blaming unrest in the country on nebulous outside forces.
Vietnam also offered implicit criticism. Late Saturday, a spokesperson for the foreign ministry called for “all relevant parties to respect international law … including the principle of respect for national sovereignty.”
While the country has cultivated warm ties with the United States for decades, there are obvious historic reasons why it is uncomfortable with unilateral U.S. intervention in other sovereign states.
U.S. treaty allies Thailand and the Philippines offered measured statements of concern on Monday, both emphasizing the importance of international law. The former called for the “protection of civilians and respecting the will of the Venezuelan people.”
The Philippines took the softest line, “acknowledging the United States’ underlying security considerations” while also noting the importance of “noninterference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states.”
Both countries are in a difficult position here.
The Philippines has relied on U.S. support to push back against Chinese incursions into its territorial waters but has also used international law to contest Chinese territorial claims in these areas.
Meanwhile, Thailand is likely reluctant to do anything that might incite Trump to reinsert himself into its dispute with Cambodia—potentially to Bangkok’s disfavor, should it offend.
The postwar arc of Southeast Asia can be crudely simplified as going from the Cold War’s great charnel house, its conflicts inflated by great-power interference, to a region defined by broad economic growth and relative peace.
It is worth noting that the first principle in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Treaty of Amity and Cooperation affirms “respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity” of all member states.
There is, of course, humbug to this. Witness Thailand and Cambodia’s border war. And, as a young officer, Indonesia’s Prabowo actually led the squad that hunted down and killed Timor Leste’s first prime minister, Nicolau dos Reis Lobato, following Indonesia’s invasion.
Still, the rhetorical commitment stands—reflecting a lively wariness of great-power interference in sovereign states.
What We’re Watching
Malaysia’s leader promises reform. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has promised a series of political reforms designed to win back disillusioned voters.
These include 10-year term limits for prime ministers (highly unusual in a parliamentary system), more independence for the public prosecutor, the establishment of an ombudsman’s office, and the introduction a freedom of information law.
Anwar had promised some these measures in the 2022 election that he won on a ticket of reform.
The prime minister’s reform push comes amid rising pressure on his government that saw it stumble in the Sabah state elections last November.
Reformist and ethnic minority voters who helped propel Anwar to power feel that promises of change and clean government have been disregarded.
And the Malay-nationalist junior governing partner—the United Malays National Organisation, which dominated government from independence in 1957 to 2018—has chafed at a reduced role, even as its support leeches away to the Malay-dominated opposition. Loud voices in the party are calling for it to leave government.
The opposition coalition is also facing a rocky moment, however.
Malaysia’s Islamist Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) is flexing its muscles.
Previously, PAS had let an allied Malay-nationalist party lead the opposition, banking on its partner to offer a softer and more professional image.
But an interparty spat forced the opposition coalition leader to resign, and PAS has indicated that it will now take leadership.
China’s Thai-Cambodia truce holding. The cease-fire between Thailand and Cambodia that took effect on Dec. 27 after China hosted talks in Yunnan appears to be holding.
While Trump took credit for the first truce, China has now taken center stage, issuing a statement on Jan. 5 that the cease-fire is being “gradually” implemented.
The release of 18 Cambodian soldiers captured in the July fighting, and who were supposed to have been released under the previous truce, is another important step.
However, the fundamental dispute remains unsolved.
A meeting of the Joint Boundary Commission to discuss the disputed border, to take place in the first week of January, has been delayed—echoing the repeated postponement of similar meetings during the previous truce.
Thailand also now occupies disputed border areas previously held by Cambodia.
The Cambodian government has accused Thailand of demolishing civilian infrastructure in these areas and blocking displaced Cambodians from returning home, with the Thai military contesting Cambodian claims.
Hun Sen, Cambodia’s de facto leader, has declared that he will not accept any changes to the border as a result of clashes.
Meanwhile, Thailand accused Cambodia of a drone incursion into its airspace following the cease-fire—something that Cambodia has denied.
Indonesia squeezes the press. Indonesian civil society groups have raised the alarm about new laws they say could stifle press freedom.
Under new laws that came into force on Jan. 2 as part of a wider overhaul of the colonial-era criminal code, “attacking the honor and dignity” of the president or vice president and promoting Marxism and other ideologies deemed contrary to state philosophy can result in a prison term of up to four years.
Public demonstrations without prior notification to authorities can be punished with up to six months in prison.
The new laws come against a backdrop of broader pressure on the Indonesian press.
In December, a clip of a CNN Indonesia reporter weeping as she described how children in Aceh were begging for food following recent floods went viral, only to be suddenly removed from all the outlet’s social media pages.
Other journalists reported having their equipment confiscated when covering the floods.
And, in March 2025, a pig’s head and dead rats were sent to journalists at Tempo, Indonesia’s leading magazine.
Photo of the Week
Ahead of the annual “Black Nazarene” procession on Jan. 9, Catholic devotees are showered with holy water during the blessing of Jesus the Nazarene replicas in Manila, the Philippines, on Jan. 3.Jam Sta Rosa/AFP via Getty Images
FP’s Most Read This Week
- 10 Conflicts to Watch in 2026 by Comfort Ero and Richard Atwood
- Trump Sets a Devastating Precedent in Venezuela by Michael Hirsh
- Venezuela Might Be Where Trump’s Luck Runs Out by Emma Ashford
What We’re Reading
Chinese companies making halal food are turning to Malaysia as a new market and production base, Iman Muttaqin Yusof details in the South China Morning Post.
Meet Bobby Saputra, Southeast Asia’s favorite spoiled brat. In Fulcrum, Brandon Tan Jun Wen spotlights a social media influencer who satirizes the nepo babies and failsons of the region.
Number of the Week
$562 billion. Thailand’s current GDP—which Vietnam may surpass this year thanks to its breakneck growth. With about 30 million more people than Thailand, Vietnam would still be significantly poorer than the former on a per capita basis. But the trend reflects the country’s rapid growth, which hit 8 percent in 2025. Hat tip to Nikkei Asia for noticing.
In Focus
In Vietnam and Indonesia, leaders of private security forces are expanding those institutions’ roles in business and the wider economy. The dynamics in each country may be rather different, however.
In Indonesia, Prabowo, a former general, has assigned the military to carry out priority policies such as clearing rainforest for plantation agriculture, as well as running the free school meals program.
He also moved to insert soldiers into state-owned companies that play a major role in the economy and handed them control of plantations seized from private companies.
The moves are often framed in terms of boosting national security by improving self-reliance.
Some worry this heralds a troubling return to the era from independence until 2004 reforms, when the armed forces controlled large swaths of the economy.
The system reached its apogee under the dictator Suharto, who was Prabowo’s father-in-law.
Vietnam also has a similar tradition of security forces’ involvement in what was long a state-led economy. Unlike in Indonesia, there were no reforms to force divestment.
In recent years, the Vietnamese police have been riding high, with the Ministry of Public Security acquiring important stakes in telecommunications companies in 2025 and setting itself up to vet foreign direct investment.
In an apparently contradictory development, Vietnam recently declared that the private sector should lead development, as part of its aggressive push for growth.
But Communist Party chief To Lam has also been keen to cement his own power, and boosting the police—his old bailiwick—will do exactly that.
But intertwining security and economics no longer seems so unusual, even in the West. Witness the U.S. Defense Department’s own new role as an eager investor.