Americans who haven’t been following Iraq for the past decade might be surprised to learn that the country just conducted a reasonably free, fair, and peaceful election. On Nov. 11, nearly 7,750 candidates competed for 329 parliamentary seats in a contest that, by the troubled standards of the region, went remarkably smoothly. There was no major violence and relatively few allegations of fraud. Despite predictions of record-low participation, election turnout reached 56 percent—comparable to many U.S. presidential elections over the past century.
Iraq, for so long a shorthand for everything that can go wrong with U.S. foreign policy, just demonstrated more democratic resilience than its critics give it credit for. Squint hard enough, and you might even see it as the closest thing to a stable, peaceful, and genuinely democratic Arab state.
Twenty-two years after the fall of Saddam Hussein, it’s worth acknowledging: Iraq is still standing, still voting, and still trying.
That said, what comes next is far from certain. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development bloc seems to have won a plurality in the election but not enough to form a government on its own. With no clear victor emerging, it could take months of political horse-trading for some of the winning parliamentary lists to assemble a coalition large enough to govern. The last time around, this process took nearly a year to play out.
Here’s another surprising piece of news: Whoever forms the next government—whether it’s Sudani, a rival from the Coordination Framework, or some compromise candidate—that person will almost certainly be more receptive to U.S. interests than to Iranian demands.
The process of forming Iraq’s government has traditionally been deeply influenced by competition between Washington and Tehran, with Iran easily outmaneuvering its superpower rival. Since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion toppled Saddam, Iraq’s politics have been dominated by its Shiite Muslim majority, and many of their parties maintain close ties to Iran, the regional Shiite power.
But Washington now has the upper hand. In part, this is because the Islamic Republic and its allies were humiliated in the brief war with Israel this year. On top of that, the theocrats in Tehran are currently distracted by a devastating drought threatening the Iranian agricultural heartland. Add to these the deepening economic crisis brought about by U.S. sanctions and regime mismanagement, and the limits of Iranian influence become clear.
This helps explain why the major Iraqi political actors, including those who have traditionally aligned with Iran, have been making conciliatory noises toward the United States. Sudani has positioned himself as the man whom Washington can trust to keep Tehran at arm’s length. More remarkable still, the political grouping associated with the Iran-backed Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia, long sworn enemies of the United States, has suggested an overlap with U.S. objectives. “We don’t believe it’s in the Americans’ interest for Iraq to be unstable or to experience unrest,” Asaib spokesperson Mahmood al-Rubaie told the New York Times.
The question is whether the Trump administration can capitalize on this remarkable shift in Iraqi sentiment. Washington has an unprecedented opening to shape Iraq’s political future in ways that serve U.S. interests. But exploiting this opportunity requires diplomatic skill, regional knowledge, and sustained attention—commodities in short supply in the Trump administration’s foreign-policy apparatus.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s go-to Middle East envoys—Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner—already have their hands full with Gaza and Israel, not to mention pursuing trade deals (for the United States) and business deals (for the Trump conglomerate) with the Gulf petrostates. For Iraq, Trump has appointed Mark Savaya, a Detroit businessman with Iraqi roots but no diplomatic experience.
Prominent Iraqi politicians have welcomed Savaya’s appointment, which is encouraging. He speaks Arabic, understands Iraqi culture, and has family connections that could prove valuable. But the moment calls for someone with impeccable diplomatic acumen as well. To achieve U.S. goals, that person must be able to work with the Shiite parties without alienating Sunnis and Kurds, push back against Iranian influence without driving Iraqi politicians into Tehran’s arms, and navigate Washington’s bureaucratic maze while maintaining trust in Baghdad.
Since the fall of Saddam, navigating the sectarian, ethnic, and regional complexities of Iraqi politics has proved too much for both seasoned diplomats, such as John Negroponte and Zalmay Khalilzad, and politically connected amateurs, such as Paul Bremer. There’s little in Savaya’s track record to suggest he can manage the delicate coalition negotiations ahead or balance competing U.S. interests in Iraq: counterterrorism, containing Iranian influence, protecting U.S. troops, maintaining energy partnerships, and supporting democratic development.
Still, there’s no gainsaying the fact that the tide of Iraqi politics is pulling away from Tehran and toward Washington. Iran’s weakness has created space for Iraqi leaders to recalibrate their relationships. Trump’s appointee has been dealt the strongest hand any U.S. envoy to Baghdad has ever had. Here’s hoping Savaya doesn’t squander it.
The most concerning cloud is Moqtada al-Sadr’s absence. The powerful Shiite cleric called for his followers to boycott this “flawed” election. Sadr has a well-earned reputation as a spoiler—unpredictable, capable of mobilizing massive protests, and willing to use violence when it suits his purposes.
The boycott undermines the next government’s legitimacy while leaving a significant chunk of Iraq’s Shiite population unrepresented. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s decision not to issue his traditional call for voter participation amplifies this concern. Sadr could yet play a constructive role, or he could wait until the government is formed and then mobilize protests demanding its dissolution. His unpredictability is the point—he can’t be blamed for the system’s failures but can always claim credit for toppling it.
Iraq’s election solved none of the country’s fundamental problems. Coalition negotiations will be messy and protracted. Whatever government emerges will face structural obstacles that have hamstrung every Iraqi administration since 2003. The muhasasa system remains entrenched. Corruption bleeds billions of dollars from state coffers. The economy depends dangerously on oil revenues.
But here’s what matters: Iraq held a reasonably free and fair election. Politicians campaigned on policy rather than pure sectarian grievance. And for the first time in two decades, the tide of Iraqi politics is pulling away from Tehran and toward Washington. That’s not just a diplomatic opportunity—it’s a potential turning point in America’s troubled relationship with Iraq.
Whether the Trump administration capitalizes on this moment will depend on Savaya’s ability to navigate Iraqi politics more successfully than his predecessors. The smart money says he’ll struggle. But unlike every U.S. envoy before him, Savaya won’t be swimming against the current. Iraqi leaders want to work with Washington. Iran’s influence has never been weaker. The opportunity is real. The question is whether the United States has the diplomatic skill and sustained attention to seize it.